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THE ACCIDENTAL AGENCY?
Sapna Kumar
Abstract
This Article presents a new model for examining the role of the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) with regard to patent
law, positing that the Federal Circuit behaves like an agency and serves as
the de facto administrator of the Patent Act. The Federal Circuit has
traditionally engaged in a form of substantive rulemaking by issuing
mandatory bright-line rules that bind the public. In reviewing patent agency
appeals, the Federal Circuit acts more like an agency than a court by
minimizing agency deference through the manipulation of standards of
review and administrative law doctrines. This position of administrator
raises several concerns. Supreme Court intervention has jeopardized the
Federal Circuit’s ability to continue engaging in substantive rulemaking,
calling into question the sustainability of the lower court’s role as
administrator. Furthermore, the Federal Circuit is caught between the
Supreme Court’s goal to unify administrative law and Congress’s goal to
unify patent law. These problems suggest that a confrontation between the
Supreme Court and Congress is inevitable.
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INTRODUCTION
When Congress passes legislation, it relies on other entities to interpret
and clarify complex statutory language. Almost always, Congress grants an
agency substantive rulemaking authority to serve this purpose.1 This
delegation of power allows the government to respond quickly to societal
and legal changes without compromising separation of powers.

1. One notable exception—besides patent law—is antitrust law. Both the Department of
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission lack substantive rulemaking authority over the key
provisions of the antitrust statutes. Hillary Greene, Guideline Institutionalization: The Role of
Merger Guidelines in Antitrust Discourse, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 841 (2006) (“The DOJ
enjoys no express or implicit grant of rulemaking authority within the antitrust realm. Though in
theory one could argue that the FTC enjoys rulemaking authority in the competition context, it is
not clear that position would prevail, and as a practical matter it is equally unlikely the FTC would
advance such a position.”); Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Antitrust Oversight of an Antitrust Dispute:
An Institutional Perspective on the Net Neutrality Debate, 7 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 19,
65 (2009) (noting that the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice “has no substantive
rulemaking authority to speak of”).
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At first glance, the Patent Act appears to be an outlier. The Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) administers the Patent Act,2 but lacks authority to
interpret the substantive provisions of the statute.3 However, close scrutiny
reveals that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit)
serves as a de facto administrator, notwithstanding the fact that it is an Article
III court.4 This role appears to have emerged from the court’s specialization5
and its mandate from Congress to promote uniformity in patent law.6
The Federal Circuit engages in two agency-like functions:
promulgating substantive rules and adjudicating disputes. The court has
historically engaged in a form of rulemaking by issuing mandatory brightline rules.7 These rules have varied in subject matter, from requiring
district courts to grant injunctions when a patent is infringed, to requiring
that all method patents be tied to a machine or involve a transformation.8
These rules function like substantive rules, in that they bind district courts,
the PTO, and the public.9
The Federal Circuit also engages in an aggressive form of adjudication
that resembles agency review of a subordinate administrative law judge.
Typically, judicial review of agencies is deferential. The Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) requires courts to review agency determinations of
fact and policy with varying degrees of deference.10 This duty to defer
stems from the unique advantages that agencies possess and has been
2. Sapna Kumar, Expert Court, Expert Agency, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1547, 1570 & n.122
(2011) (noting that “the PTO alone administers the Patent Act” and discussing why experts believe
that the PTO administers the entire Patent Act).
3. See 35 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (granting the PTO substantive rulemaking authority over the
conduct of proceedings within the PTO, but failing to grant power to interpret the remainder of the
Patent Act); see also Sarah Tran, Patent Powers, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 595, 603 (2012) (citing
Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 930 (Fed. Cir. 1991)) (discussing how limitations
in the PTO’s substantive rulemaking authority emerged out of the Federal Circuit).
4. The Federal Circuit shares many features of Article I courts. As Professor Elizabeth
Winston has observed, the court possesses the power to remove Article I Court of Federal Claims
judges for “incompetency, misconduct, neglect of duty, engaging in the practice of law, or physical
or mental disability,” a power that one generally associates with the legislative branch. Elizabeth I.
Winston, Differentiating the Federal Circuit, 76 MO. L. REV. 813, 830–31 (2011) (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 176 (2006)). It is “unclear” why “the Federal Circuit holds this power.” Id. at 833.
Furthermore, the court’s jurisdiction “is defined not by territory, but by subject matter.” Id. at 815
& n.10 (listing the subject matters over which the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction).
5. See infra Section II.A.
6. See infra Section I.D.
7. See infra Section II.B.
8. See infra Section II.C.
9. See infra Section II.D; see also Ryan Vacca, Acting Like an Administrative Agency: The
Federal Circuit En Banc, 76 MO. L. REV. 733, 744–749 (2011) (arguing that when the Federal
Circuit hears cases en banc, it engages in a form of substantive rulemaking).
10. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (providing the standards of review for questions of law and
questions of fact in both formal and informal agency proceedings).
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recognized by the Supreme Court in cases such as Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council.11
The Federal Circuit, however, has resisted giving deference to
administrative patent decisions. It has denied that the review provisions of
the APA apply to the PTO,12 has disregarded Supreme Court
administrative law precedent,13 and has construed mixed questions of law
and fact as pure questions of law to enable it to engage in de novo
review.14 By reviewing patent agency decisions heavy-handedly, the
Federal Circuit has acted like the head of an agency reining in wayward
administrative law judges.
The Federal Circuit’s unorthodox role has pros and cons. By reviewing
almost all patent appeals, the court occupies a unique position, allowing it
to bring uniformity to patent law.15 Allowing the court to freely overturn
agency decisions with which it disagrees further strengthens this role. The
current system, however, may enable the Federal Circuit to impermissibly
exercise executive branch power in order to enrich the court.16
11. 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (noting the Court has “long recognized” the strong deference
entitled to an agency by its reviewing court when the agency interprets ambiguous language in the
statute entrusted to it); see, e.g., Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435
U.S. 519, 543 (1978) (“Absent constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances the
administrative agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure and to pursue
methods of inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their multitudinous duties.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943) (“If an order is valid only
as a determination of policy or judgment which the agency alone is authorized to make and which it
has not made, a judicial judgment cannot be made to do service for an administrative judgment.”).
12. See In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that § 706 of the APA
does not apply to Federal Circuit review of PTO decisions), rev’d sub nom. Dickinson v. Zurko,
527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999).
13. See infra Section I.C.
14. See infra Section III.B; see also Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of
the APA? What the Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 301
(2007) (observing that the Federal Circuit tends to turn questions of fact and policy into questions
of law in order to review such issues de novo).
15. Administrative law scholars have argued that judicial deference to agencies promotes
uniformity. See, e.g., Michael Asimow, The Scope of Judicial Review of Decisions of California
Administrative Agencies, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1157, 1204 (1995) (arguing that judicial deference to
agencies promotes uniformity); Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some
Implications of the Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1121 (1987) (“When national uniformity in the administration of national
statutes is called for, the national agencies responsible for that administration can be expected to
reach single readings of the statutes for which they are responsible and to enforce those readings
within their own framework . . . . By removing the responsibility for precision from the courts of
appeals, the Chevron rule subdues this diversity, and thus enhances the probability of uniform
national administration of the laws.”). However, these arguments were with regard to agencies
whose decisions are potentially appealed to multiple courts of appeals, and not just to a single court.
16. The Supreme Court has spoken against actions taken by Congress “to increase its own
powers at the expense of the Executive Branch.” Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988). It is
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A more pressing question is whether the Federal Circuit’s agency-like
role is sustainable. To be an effective administrator, the Federal Circuit
needs the power to create binding bright-line rules. But the Supreme Court
has repeatedly rejected the use of these rules, thereby reducing the lower
court’s ability to provide uniformity in patent law.17 Moreover, in Mayo
Foundation for Medical Education and Research v. United States, the
Supreme Court rejected specialized rules for judicial review of tax
decisions and reaffirmed its position against exceptionalism in
administrative law.18 This decision raises the question of how long the
Federal Circuit will be able to flout core principles of administrative law to
promote uniformity in patent law.
This Article presents a new model for examining the role of the Federal
Circuit, positing that the court behaves like an executive branch agency
and serves as the de facto administrator of the Patent Act. Part I provides
background on the APA and discusses the powers of the two agencies that
handle patent issues: the PTO and the International Trade Commission
(ITC). It also discusses how the Federal Circuit’s predecessor began the
trend of minimizing deference to agency patent decisions and considers
how Congress’s decision to create the Federal Circuit had the unintended
consequence of encouraging the court to take power from patent agencies.
Part II discusses how the Federal Circuit’s specialized nature facilitates
the issuance of bright-line rules and how the Supreme Court has restricted
such rules. It then argues that these bright-line rules are the functional
equivalent of substantive rulemaking, given that they are rigid and bind
third parties, such as district courts and the PTO. Part III examines how the
Federal Circuit has exerted control over the PTO and ITC by minimizing
deference and resisting the proper application of both the APA and
administrative law precedent. Part IV explores the sustainability of the
Federal Circuit model, given the tension between unifying administrative
law and unifying patent law. It further suggests that the competing
objectives of Congress and the Supreme Court will need to be resolved in
the future.
I. A MANDATE OF UNIFORMITY
To understand how the Federal Circuit acts like an agency, it is
necessary to understand some background underlying administrative law
and the creation of the Federal Circuit. The APA was originally passed in
unclear, however, what limitations there are on a court that takes power from the executive branch.
17. See infra Section II.C.
18. 131 S. Ct. 704, 713 (2011) (holding that “[t]he principles underlying our decision in
Chevron apply with full force in the tax context” and noting that the Court saw “no reason why our
review of tax regulations should not be guided by agency expertise pursuant to Chevron to the same
extent as our review of other regulations”).
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1946 to limit the power of agencies created during the New Deal.19 But the
statute also served the purpose of creating uniformity in administrative
law—a point that the Supreme Court would later emphasize when scolding
the Federal Circuit for failing to review PTO decisions with appropriate
deference.20
Congress also sought uniformity in patent law. Until 1982, the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) heard all patent appeals from the
PTO and ITC.21 Under the leadership of Judge Giles Rich, the CCPA took
an increasingly non-deferential approach to the review of such cases.22
However, patent litigation was handled by the regional circuits, leading to
circuit splits and widespread forum-shopping.23
Congress created the Federal Circuit in 1982 to promote uniformity in
patent litigation,24 but failed to consider the effect the court would have on
the PTO and ITC. This failure was compounded when the Federal Circuit
adopted the CCPA’s anti-PTO precedent.25 Inadvertently, Congress
undermined the unification of administrative law, and set the Federal
Circuit on a collision course with the Supreme Court.
Sections A and B of this Part provide a brief overview of the APA, as
well as the PTO and ITC. Section C discusses the history of the CCPA, and
discusses how Judge Rich led a philosophical revival of the court that
changed the relationship between the judiciary and the PTO. Section D
notes that Congress created the Federal Circuit to promote uniformity in
patent law, and describes how that mandate may have led the court to act
as a quasi-agency.
A. A Brief Overview of the Administrative Procedure Act
The APA was a congressional response to the unbridled expansion of
the regulatory state. During the New Deal, the number of agencies
19. George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges
from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1560 (1996).
20. See infra Section III.A; see also Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 155 (1999).
21. See Giles S. Rich, Thirty Years of This Judging Business, 14 AIPLA Q.J. 139, 140
(1986).
22. See infra Section I.C.
23. See infra Section I.D.
24. See infra Section I.D.
25. As Professor Jeffrey Lefstin astutely observed, one of the Federal Circuit’s greatest
problems is the precedent that it chose to adopt. Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Constitution of Patent Law:
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Shape of the Federal Circuit’s Jurisprudence,
43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 843, 847 (2010) (“But by adopting the precedent of its predecessor courts, the
Federal Circuit adopted a body of patent law that had been designed for use by a particular court,
the CCPA, in a particular context, the review of patentability decisions by the Patent Office. That
act of adoption at once set the contours of the Federal Circuit’s patent jurisprudence, and hence the
contours of modern patent law.”) (citation omitted).
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dramatically increased, creating concerns that these executive branch
entities were operating unchecked.26 After much debate, the APA was
passed in 1946 as a “fierce compromise,” which instituted strong oversight
of agencies and implemented uniform judicial review.27 The final version
of the bill exempted no agencies.28
The APA provides guidelines for agency rulemaking and
adjudication—two of the core functions that agencies perform. Section 553
of the APA provides a rigid procedure for notice-and-comment
rulemaking.29 When an agency clarifies ambiguities in its organic statute
using this mechanism, it is potentially eligible for substantial deference
from the reviewing court under the Supreme Court’s decisions in Chevron
and United States v. Mead Corp.30 As discussed below, the PTO is only
permitted to use notice-and-comment rulemaking for passing procedural
rules.31
Sections 556 and 557 of the APA provide the procedure that must be
used for formal adjudication.32 Formal adjudication is a trial-like hearing;
it includes testimony by witnesses subject to cross-examination33 and the
creation of a formal record.34 As with notice-and-comment rulemaking,
26. See Shepherd, supra note 19, at 1560 (“Every legislator, both Roosevelt Democrats and
conservatives, recognized that a central purpose of the proponents of administrative reform was to
constrain liberal New Deal agencies.”).
27. See id. at 1670–72 (noting that, despite the unanimous support for the bill, members of
Congress were torn with regard to whether the APA offered sufficient oversight of agencies and
sufficient access to judicial review).
28. Consequently, the APA governs the PTO and the ITC. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S.
150, 154–55 (1999) (holding that the review provisions of the APA apply to the PTO); Osram
GmbH v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 505 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Rulings of the International
Trade Commission are reviewed on the standard of the Administrative Procedure Act.”).
29. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
30. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–30 (2001) (noting that “a very good
indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment [is] express congressional authorizations to
engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which
deference is claimed” and observing that the “overwhelming number” of Supreme Court cases
applying Chevron deference involve “notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication”).
31. See infra Subsection I.B.1; see also Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1:
From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2155 (2004) (observing
that modern administrative rulemaking is subject to rigid procedural requirements in contrast to
legislative statutemaking).
32. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556–557 (2006). These provisions also provide the procedure for formal
rulemaking, which is rarely used by agencies.
33. Id. § 556(d) (“A party is entitled to present his case or defense by oral or documentary
evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such cross-examination as may be required
for a full and true disclosure of the facts.”).
34. Id. § 556(e) (“The transcript of testimony and exhibits, together with all papers and
requests filed in the proceeding, constitutes the exclusive record for decision in accordance with
section 557 of this title . . . .”).
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when an agency interprets its ambiguous statute through formal
adjudication, it is potentially eligible for Chevron deference.35
When the ITC determines whether an imported good infringes a valid
and enforceable U.S. patent, it engages in formal adjudication, in
accordance with its organic statute.36 In contrast, the PTO generally lacks
formal adjudicative authority37 and can only utilize poorly defined informal
procedures when determining whether a patent should be granted.38
The APA furthermore established uniform standards of review for
agency actions. Under § 706, questions of law are reviewed de novo.39 In
contrast, questions of fact are set aside only if found to be “arbitrary,
capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion” or “unsupported by substantial
evidence.”40 Because questions of fact are reviewed more deferentially
than questions of law, problems may arise when a court is confronted with
a mixed question of law and fact. As discussed in Section III.B, the Federal
Circuit often recharacterizes such mixed questions as pure questions of
law, thereby enabling the court to grant less deference to the PTO and ITC
on appeal.
Although Congress passed the APA to gain control over the wayward
administrative state, over time the statute became valued for instituting
uniformity in the treatment of agencies. In the 1999 case Dickinson v.
Zurko, the Supreme Court stressed “the importance of maintaining a
uniform approach to judicial review of administrative action” and held that
the APA applied to the review of PTO decisions.41 In the 2011 Mayo
Foundation decision, the Court held that “[t]he principles underlying our
decision in Chevron apply with full force in the tax context,” and noted
that the review of tax regulations should be “guided by agency expertise
pursuant to Chevron to the same extent as our review of other

35. See supra note 30.
36. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (2006) (requiring the ITC to use formal adjudicative procedures
under §§ 556 and 557 of the APA).
37. Oddly, the PTO is allowed to engage in formal adjudication for one situation: the
suspension or exclusion of registered patent agents and attorneys from practice. See 35 U.S.C. § 32
(2006) (noting that “[t]he Director may, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, suspend or
exclude” any person, agent, or attorney from practicing before the PTO).
38. See 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2006).
39. See id. § 706.
40. Id.; Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999).
41. Id. at 154–55. Professor Orin Kerr has argued that the APA should not apply to PTO
decisions regarding the issuance of a patent because the patent system operates through private law
mechanisms, such as contract, property, and tort law. 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127, 129 (2000). In
particular, Kerr argues that a patent resembles a contract because there is an offer, acceptance, and
consideration. Id. at 135. However, the process through which the APA was passed made clear that
Congress did not intend to except patents. See Part III.A. For this reason, it does not appear that
Congress intended to create a contract right.
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regulations.”42 Thus, although the APA was originally designed to hold
agencies accountable, it evolved into a tool for limiting judicial
interference with executive branch authority.43
B. A Brief Overview of Patent Agency Powers
1. The Patent & Trademark Office
The Federal Circuit has acknowledged that Congress granted the PTO
“broad powers” over its own practice.44 The PTO is charged with granting
and issuing patents and may establish regulations that “govern the conduct
of proceedings in the Office.”45 These procedural rules are promulgated
through notice-and-comment rulemaking and therefore bind patent
applicants.46
The Patent Act also established the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences (BPAI) to hear appeals of patent rejections from examiners
and to handle patent interferences.47 An inventor whose patent is rejected
by the BPAI has the option to appeal either to a district court for further
fact-finding or directly to the Federal Circuit.48
The PTO notably lacks substantive rulemaking authority over the
Patent Act.49 It cannot use notice-and-comment rulemaking to clarify, for
example, what constitutes patentable subject matter. Consequently, the
Federal Circuit has granted Chevron deference to the PTO only when it has
42. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713 (2011).
43. See Zurko, 527 U.S. at 171 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he APA by its plain text
was intended to bring some uniformity to judicial review of agencies by raising the minimum
standards of review and not by lowering those standards which existed at the time.”).
44. Gerritsen v. Shirai, 979 F.2d 1524, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
45. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2006); accord Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920,
930 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (discussing the powers of the PTO).
46. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(B) (2006) (stating that PTO procedural rules “shall be made in
accordance with section 553” of the APA).
47. 35 U.S.C. § 6(b) (2006). Note that the BPAI has been restructured as the Patent Trial and
Appeal Board under § 7 of the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act (AIA). Pub. L. No. 112-29,
§ 7(e), 125 Stat. 284, 315 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 145).
48. Such decisions originally appealed to the District Court for the District of Columbia, but
now will go to the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia under the AIA. Compare 35
U.S.C. § 145 (2006), with 35 U.S.C.A. § 145 (West 2011).
49. See Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating that “the
broadest of the PTO’s rulemaking powers” under the Patent Act “authorizes the Commissioner to
promulgate regulations directed only to ‘the conduct of proceedings in the [PTO]’; it does NOT
grant the Commissioner the authority to issue substantive rules” (alteration in original) (quoting
Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 930 (Fed. Cir. 1991))). Commentators have noted
that the distinction between procedural and substantive rules is ambiguous, at best. See, e.g., Arti K.
Rai, Growing Pains in the Administrative State: The Patent Office’s Troubled Quest for
Managerial Control, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2051, 2070–73 (2009) (discussing the “blurry line between
substantive and procedural rules”).
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“interpret[ed] statutory provisions relat[ed] to the conduct of proceedings
in the Patent Office.”50
It is important to note that under the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act
of 2011 (AIA), the PTO did receive a variety of new responsibilities from
Congress.51 For example, the Director of the PTO may now prescribe
regulations related to post-grant review of patents and inter partes
review.52 The grant of these powers may be an indication that Congress has
greater trust in the PTO compared to twenty years ago.
But Congress stopped short of allowing the PTO to interpret the core
provisions of the Patent Act—those that affect the scope of what is
patentable. Nor did Congress explicitly grant formal adjudicative power to
the PTO, although the new hearings under the AIA do appear to be triallike.53 Thus, although the AIA represents an opportunity for the PTO to
establish greater credibility in the patent community, Congress did not
substantially alter the balance of power between the Federal Circuit and the
PTO. In short, the Federal Circuit still retains the upper hand.
2. The International Trade Commission
The ITC is an independent agency whose governing statute is the Tariff
Act of 1930. Under § 337 of the Tariff Act, the ITC may issue exclusion
orders blocking goods that infringe patents, copyrights, and trademarks
from entering the United States;54 these orders are enforced by the Bureau
of Customs and Border Protection in the Department of Homeland

50. See Cooper Techs. Co. v. Dudas, 536 F.3d 1330, 1335–37 (2008).
51. See Sarah Tran, supra note 3, at 612–23 (discussing the PTO’s new powers under the
AIA).
52. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6(c), 125 Stat. 284, 314
(2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 141).
53. See Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference for
the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. XX (2013) (discussing how the AIA establishes trial-like
proceedings for post-grant review proceedings), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2166560. Professor Wasserman proposes that such proceedings should be eligible for
Chevron deference. If the Federal Circuit did grant such deference to PTO post-grant review, this
would shift the dynamics dramatically. However, short of Supreme Court intervention, this seems
unlikely.
54. See 19 U.S.C. § 1330(f) (2006) (“The Commission shall be considered to be an
independent regulatory agency.”); About the USITC, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, http://www.us
itc.gov/press_room/about_usitc.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2012) (“The United States International
Trade Commission is an independent, quasijudicial Federal agency with broad investigative
responsibilities on matters of trade.”); 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (2006) (declaring unlawful the sale for
importation or sale after importation of goods that violate a valid and enforceable patent, copyright,
or trademark); id. § 1337(d)(1) (“If the Commission determines . . . that there is a violation of this
section, it shall direct that the articles concerned, imported by any person violating the provision of
this section, be excluded from entry into the United States . . . .”).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss1/5

10

Kumer: The Accidental Agency?

2013]

THE ACCIDENTAL AGENCY?

239

Security.55 This power arises under § 337(a) of the Tariff Act, which was
enacted to protect domestic companies against the harsh effects of free
trade.56 These exclusion orders are highly valued by patent holders,
because injunctive relief in district courts is limited.57 Final decisions from
the ITC may be appealed to the Federal Circuit.58
Unlike the PTO, the ITC is powerful. It is the administrator of the
Tariff Act and has the power to engage in formal adjudication under the
APA.59 Moreover, an argument can be made that ITC patent validity and
enforceability determinations should be entitled to deference under
Chevron.60 Nevertheless, as discussed in Section IV.D, the Federal Circuit
takes a heavy-handed approach to reviewing the ITC’s patent decisions,
and actively minimizes deference to it.
C. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
From 1929 to 1982, the five-judge CCPA reviewed all appeals from
final judgments of the PTO and the ITC, in addition to appeals from the
U.S. Customs Court.61 The CCPA was an unusual court in several respects.
Although it was created as a specialized Article I court,62 Congress

55. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (2006); 19 C.F.R. § 12.39 (2008).
56. See Sapna Kumar, The Other Patent Agency: Congressional Regulation of the ITC, 61
FLA. L. REV. 529, 542–44 (2009) (discussing how the creation of the ITC reflected a compromise
between free trade supporters and protectionists, liberalizing trade but punishing unfair competition
by foreign entities).
57. Under eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., a district court can only grant injunctive relief
if a four-part balancing test is met. 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). That decision, however, does not
apply to the ITC. Spansion, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1359 (2010) (“Given the
different statutory underpinnings for relief before the Commission in Section 337 actions and before
the district courts in suits for patent infringement, this court holds that eBay does not apply to
Commission remedy determinations under Section 337.”).
58. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (2006).
59. Id. (“Each determination under subsection (d) or (e) of this section shall be made on the
record after notice and opportunity for a hearing in conformity with the provisions of subchapter II
of chapter 5 of title 5 [of the APA].”).
60. See Kumar, supra note 2, at 1562–85; see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218, 229–30 (2001) (noting that “a very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment
[is] express congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that
produces regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed” and observing that the
“overwhelming number” of Supreme Court cases applying Chevron deference involve “notice-andcomment rulemaking or formal adjudication”).
61. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, The New Federal Circuit Mandamus, 45 IND. L. REV. 343, 362
n.135 (2012) (discussing the jurisdiction of the CCPA). The U.S. Customs Court was later replaced
by the Court of International Trade. Rich, supra note 21, at 141.
62. In 1929, the Supreme Court held that the CCPA was an Article I court. Ex parte Bakelite
Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 460 (1929) (“[I]t is plain that the Court of Customs Appeals is a legislative
and not a constitutional court.”).
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converted it to an Article III court in 1958.63 Congress explained the
conversion by noting that the court was “exercising judicial rather than
administrative power,”64 though it is unclear what changed in the court’s
mission. Second, although patent cases by one account comprised 80%–
85% of the CCPA’s docket,65 the CCPA judges were primarily politically
connected individuals who had no prior knowledge of patent law.66
In the 1960s, the CCPA began to experience a transformation that
ultimately led to a more hands-on review of the PTO. Early CCPA
decisions emphasized the need to defer to the PTO’s expertise. For
example, in Dickinson v. Zurko, the Supreme Court examined eighty-nine
pre-APA CCPA decisions.67 The Court noted that in “nearly half” of those
cases, the CCPA used the “manifest error” standard of review because of
the PTO’s expertise and the PTO’s ability to “deal with technically
complex subject matter.”68 It further observed that “[i]n more than threefourths of the cases[,] the CCPA” found that deference to PTO fact-finding
was warranted because two or more PTO tribunals had agreed on the
facts.69 Thus, the early CCPA showed deference to the PTO,70 recognizing
the agency’s superior knowledge of patent law and technology.
Two major factors, however, contributed to a shift in CCPA
jurisprudence. In 1952, Congress overhauled the Patent Act. The new Act
was not drafted by any members of Congress, but rather by then-patent
practitioner Giles Rich and Patent Office Examiner-In-Chief Pasquale
Federico; the Patent Act passed both houses of Congress without any
debate.71 Because Congress failed to grant the PTO interpretive rulemaking
63. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 526 (1966) (noting that Congress declared “the CCPA
‘a court established under article III . . . ,’ that is, a constitutional court exercising judicial rather
than administrative power” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 211 (1964)).
64. Id.
65. Rich, supra note 21, at 140–41. Note the portion of Judge Rich’s essay that lists the
statistic of the CCPA’s docket lacks citations.
66. Id. at 142.
67. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 155 (1999).
68. Id. at 160.
69. Id.
70. See Lynn E. Eccleston & Harold C. Wegner, The Rich-Smith Years of the U.S. Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, 3 J. FED. CIRCUIT HIST. SOC’Y 49, 50 (2009) (noting that the pre-Rich
CCPA “had been largely a rubber stamp for decisions of the Patent Office”).
71. According to former CCPA and Federal Circuit Judge Giles S. Rich, “[t]he New Patent
Act went through both houses on consent calendars, and those houses relied on the unanimous
recommendations of their respective committees.” Neil A. Smith, Remembrances and Memorial:
Judge Giles Sutherland Rich 1904–1999, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 163, 166 (2000);
see also Giles S. Rich, Why and How Section 103 Came to Be, 14 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 181, 181–82
(2004) (reprinted from NONOBVIOUSNESS—THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY 1:201–
1:213 (John F. Witherspoon ed., 1980)) (discussing how Rich and Federico drafted the 1952 Patent
Act).
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authority over the substantive provisions of the Patent Act, the CCPA was
uniquely positioned to make key choices regarding implementation.
Second, in 1956, Giles Rich became the first judge with patent
expertise appointed to the CCPA;72 he had practiced as a patent attorney
for several decades, written law review articles in the field, and co-drafted
the 1952 Patent Act.73 A few years later, Judge Arthur Smith was
appointed to the bench.74 Judge Smith also had patent expertise, and
together, the two judges were able to start influencing the court.75 This
power shift, combined with the newly passed Patent Act, had a substantial
effect on the court’s jurisprudence.
As Professor Jeffery Lefstin observes, under the guidance of Judge
Rich, the CCPA’s judicial philosophy became one of maintaining control
over the PTO and providing legitimacy for the court’s actions.76 Judge
Rich noted, “In the CCPA, we were not reviewing trials, and Rule 52(a)
was not applicable. Or if it was, we ignored it. Reviewing the PTO Boards,
our attitude was we reversed them if they were wrong.”77 The CCPA was
able to maintain this high level of control over the PTO by virtue of the
fact that PTO decisions could only be appealed to that court.
In maintaining this control, the CCPA flagrantly disregarded
administrative law. It failed to acknowledge that the APA applies to the
PTO, except in the context of standing.78 Instead, as Judge Rich observed,
the CCPA arbitrarily reversed the PTO, not sticking to any one standard
and certainly not following the APA.
72. See Rich, supra note 21, at 142–43 (noting that the patent bar had become “fed up” with
the fact that no judge with intellectual property experience had been appointed to the CCPA and
subsequently worked to have Giles S. Rich appointed); Lefstin, supra note 25, at 848 n.21.
73. James F. Davis, Judge Giles S. Rich: His Life and Legacy Revisited, LANDSLIDE,
Sept./Oct. 2009, at 8, 9–10.
74. Lefstin, supra note 25, at 848 n.21.
75. See Eccleston & Wegner, supra note 70, at 51, 53 (noting that immediately following
Judge Smith’s joining the CCPA, Judges Rich and Smith “established important precedents that
became landmarks” and “transformed the CCPA” away from a court that once “routinely rubber
stamped the Patent Office to a court that actively explored patent law doctrines”).
76. See Lefstin, supra note 25, at 857 (maintaining that after the passage of the 1952 Patent
Act, “statutory fidelity” and “conceptual differentiation” were the CCPA’s key jurisprudential
methods, which “provided doctrinal levers for the court to control the Patent Office’s decisions”
and “provided legitimacy for the court’s exercise of that control”).
77. Rich, supra note 21, at 149 (emphasis added).
78. A search of all CCPA cases on Lexis with the terms (“PTO” or “patent w/5 office”) and
“administrative procedure act” revealed only one PTO appeal where the APA was invoked in the
context of standing. See In Re Kahn, Appeal No. 79-545, 1979 CCPA LEXIS 263, at *1 (April 18,
1979) (holding that CCPA did not have jurisdiction over Kahn’s challenge to the PTO’s decision to
strike his reissuance application on the grounds of collateral estoppel, and that such a suit needed to
be filed in district court under section 702 of the APA). See also Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1455
(observing that notwithstanding the passage of the APA, the CCPA continued to review patent
decisions “without a clearly articulated standard of review”).
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This attitude carried over to the Federal Circuit, brought in part by the
judges who came from the CCPA and Court of Claims.79 Judge Rich—
who became one of the inaugural Federal Circuit judges—acknowledged
that the Federal Circuit engaged in “de novo fact finding and delving into
the record on our own when we should not.”80 He recognized that he was
“probably one of the offenders.”81 But he defended the practice, stating: “I
do not know how one can decide whether a finding of fact is clearly
erroneous without delving into the record, and surely we have the right to
make such a decision.”82
The Federal Circuit cemented this position with its first decision,
adopting CCPA caselaw as controlling precedent83 and disregarding the
precedent of the regional circuits. In doing so, the Federal Circuit adopted
the CCPA’s non-deferential approach to reviewing PTO and ITC
decisions. As Federal Circuit Judge Jay Plager remarked in 1993:
I thought the PTO was an administrative agency. But we don’t
review it as if it is. There is no other administrative agency in
the United States that I know of in which the standard of
review over the agency’s decisions gives the appellate court
as much power over the agency as we have over the PTO.84
Thus, the acts of the defunct CCPA continue to influence the Federal
Circuit with regard to the review of PTO decisions.
D. The Creation of the Federal Circuit
Although the idea of Congress’s creating a national court for patent
appeals had been around since the late nineteenth century,85 the idea did
79. See Federal Court Improvement Act of 1982, § 165, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25, 50
(1982) (“The judges of the United States Court of Claims and of the United States Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals in regular active service on the effective date of this Act shall continue
in office as judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.”).
80. Rich, supra note 21, at 149.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
84. Craig Allen Nard, Deference, Defiance, and the Useful Arts, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1415, 1415
(1995) (quoting S. Jay Plager, An Interview with Circuit Judge S. Jay Plager, 5 J. PROPRIETARY
RTS. 2, 5 (1993)); see also Sarah Tran, Administrative Law, Patents, and Distorted Rules, 80 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 831, 834 (2012) (discussing how unusually weak the PTO is compared to other
federal agencies).
85. Paul M. Janicke, To Be Or Not To Be: The Long Gestation of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit (1887-1982), 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 645, 645 (2001) (“Bills in Congress to
create a national court for patent appeals had appeared as early as 1887, and the specific mechanism
for fashioning a patent-and-other-things court by expanding the jurisdictions of preexisting courts
was debated since 1906.”)
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not gain traction until the 1970s. By 1977, the Senate was considering two
bills to create a National Court of Appeals.86 In 1978, the Department of
Justice’s Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice
proposed a merger of the CCPA and the United States Court of Claims to
handle patent and tax appeals.87 This proposal was soon narrowed to
encompass only patent litigation appeals.88
During the debate on how to reform the judiciary, a common theme
emerged regarding the need for uniformity in the patent system. Each court
of appeals was faced with the task of interpreting the Patent Act, which
gave rise to numerous circuit splits and disparate treatment of patents. For
example, the Eighth Circuit invalidated 89% of all patents, whereas the
Tenth Circuit invalidated only 30% of them.89
The president-elect of the American Patent Law Association described
the situation as a “crisis,” and linked a “decline of . . . technological
superiority” in the United States to the ineffective patent litigation
system.90 In the House Report for the Federal Courts Improvement Act,
Congress stressed the problems of “undue forum-shopping and unsettling
inconsistency in adjudications” stemming from patent appeals being heard
in the regional circuits.91 It further noted that the “establishment of a single
court to hear patent appeals was repeatedly singled out by the witnesses” as
the best way to strengthen the patent system, and would provide
“nationwide uniformity in patent law.”92
Consequently, when Congress passed the Federal Courts Improvement
Act of 1982 (FCIA),93 it gave the newly established Federal Circuit the
mandate to unify patent law. Congress granted the Federal Circuit
86. COMM. ON REVISION OF THE FED. JUDICIAL SYS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE NEEDS OF THE
FEDERAL COURTS 17–18 (1977), available at http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4178233 (discussing
two Senate bills under review by a subcommittee).
87. Janicke, supra note 85, at 654–55 (citing OFFICE FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN THE ADMIN. OF
JUSTICE, A PROPOSAL TO IMPROVE THE FEDERAL APPELLATE SYSTEM (1978)). This idea surfaced
again when the APA was being drafted. The 1935 ABA Committee report included a
recommendation that a single administrative court be created covering the jurisdictions for Court of
Claims, the Board of Tax Appeals, the Customs Court, and the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals. Shepherd, supra note 19, at 1575.
88. Janicke, supra note 85, at 658–59 (noting that the Senate passed a bill in 1979 removing
any tax from the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction, and that the House followed suit in 1980).
89. Lawrence Baum, The Federal Courts and Patent Validity: An Analysis of the Record, 56
J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 758, 762 (1974).
90. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—1981: Hearing on H.R. 2405 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
97th Cong. 50 (1981) (statement of J. Jancin, Jr., President Elect Am. Patent Law Ass’n).
91. H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20 (1981).
92. Id. Note, however, that the decision to establish a national patent court was highly
controversial. See Kumar, supra note 2, at 1604.
93. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).
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jurisdiction over the overwhelming majority of patent appeals,94 thereby
allowing the court to shape patent law as it saw fit. The fact that numerous
provisions of the Patent Act are highly ambiguous and that the PTO lacks
interpretive authority over the substantive provisions made the new court’s
position even stronger.
Congress’s uniformity mandate, however, had unintended
consequences. When Congress passed the FCIA, it paid attention to neither
the PTO nor ITC.95 Yet, to unify patent law, rules were needed to interpret
ambiguities in the Patent Act. This need would give rise to the use of
bright-line rules in the Federal Circuit. Moreover, by declaring a need for
uniform patent law, Congress opened the door to the Federal Circuit’s
disregard of deferential review mandated in administrative law. Thus,
Congress ultimately failed to see that the price of uniformity would be paid
by the executive branch of government.
II. FEDERAL CIRCUIT RULEMAKING
There are a number of reasons why Congress chooses to delegate
power to an executive branch agency. Agencies possess subject-matter
expertise and institutional advantages, and can deal with politically
charged policy decisions.96 Instead of attempting to fine-tune a difficult
area of law, Congress can pass a broad law and delegate substantive
rulemaking authority to an agency.97 The agency can then engage in noticeand-comment rulemaking under § 553 of the APA to fill gaps in its organic
statute.
Although the Federal Circuit is an Article III court, it is similarly
situated to an agency. Congress entrusted the court with near-exclusive
94. Originally, if the petitioner’s well-pleaded complaint did not assert a claim arising under
patent law, the Federal Circuit would not have jurisdiction over the appeal. Holmes Grp., Inc. v.
Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830 (2002). However, under the AIA, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338(a) was amended to state: “No State court shall have jurisdiction over any claim for relief
arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, or copyrights.”
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. Law 112-29. § 19(a), 125 Stat. 331 (2011). Also, the AIA
amended 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) to broaden the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction to include appeals “in
any civil action arising under, or in any civil action in which a party has asserted a compulsory
counterclaim arising under, any Act of Congress relating to patents or plant variety protection.” Id.
§ 19(b), 125 Stat. 331.
95. Kumar, supra note 2, at 1583.
96. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J.
523, 534 (1992) (“There are numerous reasons for Congress’s willingness to delegate significant
lawmaking power to agencies, including the institutional advantages agencies have in developing
detailed policy prescriptions and the congressional inclination to avoid or defer controversial policy
decisions.”).
97. The Supreme Court recognized Congress’s limitations in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), where it noted that “judges are not experts,” and
therefore are not in the best position to engage in policy making. Id. at 865–66.
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jurisdiction in interpreting a vague area of law. Moreover, the Federal
Circuit has been dominated by patent specialists with a vested interest in
shaping patent law.98 Consequently, the court has had strong motivation to
address the lingering confusion that was caused by the passage of the
Patent Act of 1952.99
But how can a court engage in rulemaking? The Federal Circuit’s
answer came in the form of bright-line rules. Encouraged by the Supreme
Court in the late 1990s, the Federal Circuit increasingly utilized rigid tests
that bound not just the parties, but also district courts and the PTO. These
tests were both legislative-like and forward-looking, thereby taking on
characteristics of a substantive rule. Their effect was also similar to that of
an agency rule, providing clarity and greater certainty to inventors, though
at the expense of providing nuanced case-by-case decisionmaking.
In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has severely restricted the
Federal Circuit’s use of such rules. This calls into question the Federal
Circuit’s ability to continue administering the Patent Act.
Section A of this Part discusses the specialized nature of the Federal
Circuit and how this has promoted rulemaking. Section B describes the
court’s increasing reliance on bright-line rules. Section C then discusses
how the Supreme Court pushed back against these rules, beginning in
1993. Finally, Section D argues that bright-line rules function as a form of
rulemaking and that the Supreme Court’s rejection of bright-line rules
jeopardizes the Federal Circuit’s ability to act as a de facto administrator.
A. Specialization
It would be impossible for the Federal Circuit to engage in rulemaking
on any meaningful scale without its specialized knowledge of patent law.
Yet Congress did not intend for the Federal Circuit to become a specialized
court.100 The House Judiciary Committee emphasized that the new court
would have “a varied docket spanning a broad range of legal issues and
types of cases.”101 The Committee also believed that appellate courts
would establish rules regarding how to handle ancillary and pendent patent
claims,102 implying that other courts would continue to hear patent cases.
98. Initially, this patent expertise came from the five CCPA judges who joined the Federal
Circuit in 1982. Over time, more judges with patent backgrounds would be appointed to the court.
See supra Section I.C.
99. See, e.g., Dana Remus Irwin, Paradise Lost in the Patent Law? Changing Visions of
Technology in the Subject Matter Inquiry, 60 FLA. L. REV. 775, 804–07 (2008) (discussing the
“segmented approach” of the 1952 Act); Harold C. Wegner, The Disclosure Requirements of the
1952 Patent Act: Looking Back and a New Statute for the Next Fifty Years, 37 AKRON L. REV. 243
(2004) (discussing changes to § 112 under the 1952 Act).
100. H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 19 (1981).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 41.
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Although only one-third of the Federal Circuit’s docket is patent law,103
the remainder does not attract nearly as much attention. No judge appears
to have been appointed to the court because of his or her expertise in
veterans affairs, government contracts, or personnel law.104 One might
have expected trade to have played a larger role in Federal Circuit
appointments as well, given that the Federal Circuit reviews decisions from
the Court of International Trade and the ITC. Yet it was not until President
Barack Obama appointed Judge Jimmie Reyna in 2011 that the court
received its first trade expert.105
Four of the ten active judges had patent backgrounds prior to joining
the Federal Circuit. Judge Kimberly Moore was a patent law professor and
clerked for Judge Glen Archer on the Federal Circuit.106 Judge Alan Lourie
103. See Tony Dutra, “Introspective Look” at Federal Circuit Highlights Breadth of Court’s
Docket, 77 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 560, 560 (2009) (noting that 31% of the Federal
Circuit’s docket is intellectual property cases, nearly all of which involve patents); John M. Golden,
The Supreme Court As “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions in
Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 665 (2009) (“Patent appeals typically form only about a third of
the court’s docket.”).
104. See Chief Judge Paul R. Michel, State of the Court Address at the Judicial Conference for
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 1–2 (May 20, 2010), http://www.cafc.us
courts.gov/images/stories/announcements/2010/stateofthecourt10.pdf (“I note that our court lacks
anyone from West of the Allegheny Mountains, any Asian-American or African-American and
anyone appointed who has specialized in contract, international trade, veterans or personnel law.”);
see also Steven L. Schooner, A Random Walk: The Federal Circuit’s 2010 Government Contract
Decisions, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1067, 1069 (2011) (discussing the lack of judges with government
contract experience).
105. See Cardin Applauds Confirmation of Marylander Jimmie Reyna to Federal Circuit
Bench, (quoting Senator Ben Cardin as stating that “Mr. Reyna is an outstanding trade lawyer who
brings over 20 years of invaluable international trade experience to a court that —while responsible
for such adjudication—previously did not have an international trade expert among its ranks.”)
available online at http://www.cardin.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/cardin-applaudsconfirmation-of-marylander-jimmie-reyna-to-federal-circuit-bench. Jason Rantanen, Senate
Confirms Jimmie V. Reyna to the CAFC, PATENTLY-O (Apr. 6, 2011, 11:13 AM),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/04/senate-confirms-jimmie-v-reyna-to-the-cafc.html
(discussing Judge Reyna’s international trade experience). President Obama also appointed Judge
Kathleen O’Malley, who is the only judge in the history of the Federal Circuit who had previously
served as a federal district court judge. See Biography of Kathleen M. O’Malley, Circuit Judge,
U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR FED. CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/kath leen-m-omalleycircuit-judge.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2012) [hereinafter Kathleen M. O’Malley]; Steven Schooner,
A Random Walk: The Federal Circuit's 2010 Government Contracts Decisions, 60 Am. U. L. Rev.
1067, 1070 n.7 (2011) (observing that Judge O’Malley is the first district court judge to get elevated
to the Federal Circuit). This is in contrast to other courts of appeal, where district court judges are
frequently elevated to appellate courts.
106. Judicial Nominations, Judge Kimberly A. Moore, GEORGE W. BUSH WHITE HOUSE
ARCHIVES, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/judicialnominees/moore.html (last
visited Sept. 28, 2012); Biography of Kimberly A. Moore, Circuit Judge, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR
FED. CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/kimberly-a-moore-circuit-judge.html (last
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was both the Vice President of Corporate Patents and Trademarks, and
Associate General Counsel of SmithKline Beecham Corporation; he was
also the President of the Philadelphia Patent Law Association.107 Judge
Pauline Newman served as director of the Patent, Trademark and Licensing
Department at FMC Corp., and prior to that was a patent attorney.108 Judge
Kathleen O’Malley, as a district court judge, presided over more than 100
patent and trademark cases; she also served as judicial liaison to the Local
Patent Rules Committee for the Northern District of Ohio and regularly
taught a law school course on patent litigation.109 Also, Federal Circuit
nominee Richard Taranto “participated in dozens of Federal Circuit patent
appeals” as a litigator, argued three intellectual property cases before the
Supreme Court, and taught patent law at Harvard.110
Those judges who started out as non-specialists quickly developed
patent expertise. For example, Chief Judge Randall Raider did not have a
patent background before he became a Federal Circuit judge. However, he
subsequently taught patent law and other intellectual property courses at
several law schools, and has coauthored a patent law casebook.111
This high level of specialization distinguishes the Federal Circuit from
other Article III appellate courts. The court’s closest analog is the D.C.
Circuit, which is highly regarded for its expertise in administrative law.112
The D.C. Circuit is viewed as a feeder court to the Supreme Court, given
that four of the current Justices were elevated from it.113 This allows the
D.C. Circuit to attract highly qualified judges from a variety of
backgrounds. However, all courts of appeal hear a substantial number of
agency appeals, making the D.C. Circuit’s expertise less unusual than that
visited Sept. 28, 2012).
107. Biography of Alan D. Lourie, Circuit Judge, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR FED. CIRCUIT,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/alan-d-lourie-circuit-judge.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2012).
108. Biography of Pauline Newman, Circuit Judge, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR FED. CIRCUIT,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/pauline-newman-circuit-judge.html (last visited Sept. 28,
2012).
109. Kathleen M. O’Malley, supra note 105.
110. Next Federal Circuit Judge Nominee: Richard G. Taranto, PATENTLY-O (Nov. 10, 2011,
9:42 AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/11/next-federal-circuit-judge-nominee-richard-gtaranto.html.
111. Biography of Randall R. Rader, Chief Judge, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR FED. CIRCUIT,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/randall-r-rader-chief-judge.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2012).
112. See John M. Golden, The Federal Circuit and the D.C. Circuit: Comparative Trials of
Two Semi-Specialized Courts, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 553, 554–55 (2010) (discussing the D.C. and
Federal Circuits as being examples of semi-specialized courts, but acknowledging that “the Federal
Circuit’s grip on patent appeals is much more complete than the D.C. Circuit’s grip on appeals
involving administrative law.”).
113. Id. at 556 (noting that the D.C. Circuit “enjoys unmatched prestige” due in part to its
status as a “feeder court” for the Supreme Court).
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of the Federal Circuit.
Consequently, the Federal Circuit is in the unique position of
possessing sufficient competence in a single area of law allowing it to
dramatically shape that area. As Part IV discusses, this expertise has led
the court to second-guess the PTO and ITC, thereby overstepping its
authority as an Article III court.
B. The Rise of Bright-Line Rules
When Congress passes a statute and fails to delegate its interpretation
to an agency, that power effectively passes to the courts.114 Thus, when
Congress failed to grant the PTO substantive rulemaking authority over the
key sections of the Patent Act, the Federal Circuit was well within its
authority to step in and interpret ambiguities in the statute. The court’s
preferred method of doing this is through mandatory bright-line rules that
mimic substantive rulemaking.115
Bright-line rules have existed since the early days of the Federal
Circuit. For example, its presumption that an infringer is entitled to
permanent injunctive relief dates back to 1983, when the court held that
“where validity and continuing infringement have been clearly
established . . . immediate irreparable harm is presumed” and that “[a]
court should not be reluctant to use its equity powers once a party has so
clearly established his patent rights.”116 The Federal Circuit also inherited
bright-line rules when it adopted CCPA decisions as precedent.117 The
“teaching, suggestion, or motivation” test was created by the CCPA to
show whether a combination of prior art is obvious.118 Relying firmly on
this precedent, the Federal Circuit established that this test was
114. Professor Margaret Lemos has discussed judicially administered statutes at length. She
notes that “[w]hen Congress enacts a statute, it inevitably resolves some policy disputes and leaves
others open. All legislation leaves some residuum of policymaking power to the institution—court
or agency—charged with administering it.” Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially
Administered Statutes and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 428 (2008)
(citations omitted).
115. See infra Section II.D.
116. Smith Int’l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983), abrogated by
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006), as recognized in Robert Bosch LLC
v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1141, 1148 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
117. South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982). This decision had
the effect of disregarding patent precedent from the regional circuits, including courts such as the
Seventh Circuit that were highly respected by practitioners.
118. In re Bergel, 292 F.2d 955, 956–57 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (finding nothing in the record to
suggest combining two prior art references and noting that “[t]he mere fact that it is possible to find
two isolated disclosures which might be combined in such a way to produce a new compound does
not necessarily render such production obvious unless the art also contains something to suggest the
desirability of the proposed combination”).
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mandatory.119
The Federal Circuit did retain some more nuanced, policy-minded
tests.120 For example, in the court’s early days, it noted that “[r]igid
standards are especially unsuited to the on sale provision where the policies
underlying the bar, in effect, define it.”121 It stated that “the facts of each
case must be weighed in view of public policy,” balancing “prompt and
widespread disclosure of inventions to the public” with giving the inventor
sufficient time to determine whether to seek a patent.122
In 1998, the Supreme Court sent a strong message that it preferred
bright-line rules.123 In Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, the unanimous Court
announced a rule articulating when an invented device is “on sale” under
§ 102(b) of the Patent Act.124 The Court held that the on-sale bar applies
when the product is “the subject of a commercial offer for sale” and when
the invention is “ready for patenting.”125 In that case—even though Wayne
Pfaff’s invention had not been reduced to practice—the Court found the
invention was ready for patenting, because Pfaff had provided the
manufacturer with a description and drawings sufficient to allow a person
skilled in the art to practice the invention.126
The Court did not leave the Federal Circuit entirely unchecked. In
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., the en banc Federal
Circuit held that prosecution history estoppel arises from any amendment

119. See, e.g., ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (“Obviousness cannot be established by combining the teachings of the prior art to produce
the claimed invention, absent some teaching or suggestion supporting the combination. Under
section 103, teachings of references can be combined only if there is some suggestion or incentive
to do so.” (citing In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048 (C.C.P.A. 1976); In re Regel, 526 F.2d 1399
(C.C.P.A. 1975); In re Avery, 518 F.2d 1228 (C.C.P.A. 1975); In re Imperato, 486 F.2d 585
(C.C.P.A. 1973); In re Andre, 341 F.2d 304 (C.C.P.A. 1965))).
120. See John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 778
(2003) (noting that the Federal Circuit employed totality of the circumstances tests “[d]uring its first
decade and well into its second”).
121. W. Marine Elecs., Inc. v. Furuno Elec. Co., 764 F.2d 840, 844 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
122. Id. at 845.
123. As early as 1999, commentators predicted that Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, 525 U.S. 55
(1998), would push the Federal Circuit toward bright-line rules. See Isabelle R. McAndrews, The
On-sale Bar After Pfaff v. Wells Electronics: Toward a Bright-Line Rule, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 155 (1999).
Oddly, although the Supreme Court supported agency-like rulemaking in the Federal Circuit
during the 1990s, it also criticized the Federal Circuit for failing to grant proper deference to
appeals from the PTO. In Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999), the Supreme Court held that the
APA applies to patent decisions from the PTO, and that the Federal Circuit must apply the
appropriate standard of review under § 706 of the APA. Id. at 152.
124. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., 525 U.S. 55, 56, 67 (1998).
125. Id. at 67.
126. Id. at 68.
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that narrows a claim to comply with any part of the Patent Act127 and that a
flexible case-by-case approach was unworkable because it hinders
predictability.128 The Supreme Court reversed. It held that although the
inventor cannot use the doctrine to recapture what she gave up to get the
claim through the PTO, she can apply the doctrine to the narrow claim that
was issued.129 The Court recognized that although this approach would
introduce uncertainty, this was “the price of ensuring the appropriate
incentives for innovation.”130
In the face of these inconsistencies, the Federal Circuit continued to
create more bright-line rules. In Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., the Federal
Circuit drew a line between declaratory judgment cases that satisfy the
case-or-controversy requirement and those that do not.131 The court held
that a patent licensee in compliance with its license could not establish an
Article III case or controversy for a declaratory judgment action regarding
patent validity, enforceability, or scope.132
C. The Supreme Court and the Fall of the Bright-Line Rule
The Supreme Court’s attitude toward bright-line patent rules shifted in
the mid-2000s with the changes in court membership. In the 2006 decision
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the Court found patent exceptionalism
to be inappropriate, and rejected the Federal Circuit’s rule of granting
injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement.133 The Supreme Court
held that district courts cannot grant an injunction unless the plaintiff
demonstrates:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies
available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to
compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in
equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not
be disserved by a permanent injunction.134
127. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 568 (Fed. Cir.
2000), vacated, 535 U.S. 722, 742 (2002).
128. Id. at 596.
129. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 741 (2002).
130. Id. at 732.
131. Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2004), rev’d sub nom.
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
132. Id.; see also MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 122, 137 (2007)
(discussing, and ultimately reversing, the Gen-Probe decision); Liza Vertinsky, Reconsidering
Patent Licensing in the Aftermath of MedImmune, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1609, 1615–16 (2009)
(discussing the Federal Circuit’s bright-line “reasonable apprehension of suit” test).
133. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006).
134. Id. at 391.
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The Court stated that “[t]hese familiar principles apply with equal force to
disputes arising under the Patent Act,” and maintained that the Patent Act
did not evince an intent by Congress to depart from traditional equitable
practice.135
One year later, in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., the Supreme
Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s rule that a company that licenses a
patent cannot establish “actual controversy” unless it breaches the license
agreement.136 In dicta, the Court also rejected the Federal Circuit’s
“reasonable apprehension of suit” test for justiciability of claims in
declaratory judgment actions.137 Under this test, the Federal Circuit
previously held that a declaratory plaintiff must have a reasonable
apprehension of being imminently sued.138 The Supreme Court stated that
the reasonable apprehension of suit test conflicted with earlier Court cases
holding that apprehension of a suit was not necessary for bringing a
declaratory judgment.139
The same year, the Supreme Court struck down the Federal Circuit’s
rule that the teaching-suggestion-motivation (TSM) test for obviousness
was mandatory.140 With regard to the question of obviousness, the Court
stated “our cases have set forth an expansive and flexible approach
inconsistent with the way the Court of Appeals applied its TSM test.”141
Although the Court recognized that it had advocated “uniformity and
definiteness” in an earlier decision, it observed that it had also advocated
examining “secondary considerations” where appropriate.142 The Court
further noted that the Federal Circuit had taken a useful guiding principle
from the CCPA too far.143
In the 2008 decision In re Bilski, the Federal Circuit held that the
machine-or-transformation test, first articulated by the court in 1998,144
135. Id. at 391–92.
136. MedImmune, Inc., 549 U.S. at 132.
137. Id. at 132 n.11.
138. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2005). This rule is
not based on CCPA precedent, but rather on precedent from the Third Circuit. C.R. Bard, Inc. v.
Schwartz, 716 F.2d 874, 880 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (rejecting the Third Circuit’s approach to jurisdiction
“that there can never be an apprehension of a federal infringement suit . . . when a license is still in
effect” in favor of a more lenient approach that “a reasonable apprehension of an infringement suit”
gives rise to jurisdiction).
139. MedImmune, Inc., 549 U.S. at 132 n.11.
140. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) (“We begin by rejecting the
rigid approach of the Court of Appeals.”).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 415–16 (citing Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966)).
143. Id. at 418–19 (“But when a court transforms the general principle into a rigid rule that
limits the obviousness inquiry, as the Court of Appeals did here, it errs.”).
144. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (“Today, we hold that the transformation of data, representing discrete dollar amounts, by a
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was mandatory for determining the patent eligibility of a process under
§ 101 of the Patent Act.145 The Supreme Court affirmed the invalidity of
the patent at issue, but held that a nonabstract business method can be
patentable even if it fails the test.146 The Court reiterated “that courts
should not read into the patent laws limitations and conditions which the
legislature has not expressed,”147 making its strongest statement to date
against judicial rulemaking. The Supreme Court also noted that, in
recognizing limited exceptions to patentable subject matter, it had not
given courts “carte blanche to impose other limitations that are
inconsistent with the text and the statute’s purpose and design.”148
Finally, in Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative
Services, the claim at issue involved a method that allowed doctors to
measure metabolites in the blood to determine whether the patient’s dose
of a particular drug was too high or low.149 The Federal Circuit observed
that the Supreme Court “did not disavow the machine-or-transformation
test” in Bilski.150 It held that the claim was patent-eligible under § 101
because it related to the application of a natural phenomenon, and that the
process of administering the drug to the patient and measuring the
transformation in the blood satisfied the transformation prong of the
machine-or-transformation test.151
The Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit 9–0, observing that “to
transform an unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible application
of such a law, one must do more than simply state the law of nature while
adding the words ‘apply it.’”152 Although the Court emphasized that
machine-or-transformation was not met in this case, it stressed that it had
“neither said nor implied that the test trumps the ‘law of nature’
machine through a series of mathematical calculations into a final share price, constitutes a practical
application of a mathematical algorithm, formula, or calculation, because it produces ‘a useful,
concrete and tangible result’—a final share price momentarily fixed for recording and reporting
purposes and even accepted and relied upon by regulatory authorities and in subsequent trades.”).
145. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“The Supreme Court, however, has
enunciated a definitive test to determine whether a process claim is tailored narrowly enough to
encompass only a particular application of a fundamental principle rather than to pre-empt the
principle itself. A claimed process is surely patent-eligible under § 101 if: (1) it is tied to a
particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or
thing.”), aff’d on other grounds, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010).
146. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226–27, 3231 (2010).
147. Id. at 3226 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
148. Id. at 3226.
149. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1350 (Fed. Cir.
2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
150. Id. at 1355.
151. Id. at 1355–56.
152. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012).
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exclusion.”153
This series of Supreme Court decisions establish that the Federal
Circuit’s rigid reliance on rules will no longer be tolerated. The Court has
not expressed concern over the Federal Circuit’s creating tests to help
clarify ambiguities in the Patent Act, but rather over its making such tests
mandatory.154 This backlash against judicial rulemaking, however, raises
an important question—whether the Federal Circuit’s actions were
improper and what the Supreme Court’s motivation was for intervening.
D. Bright-Line Rules as Substantive Rules
Scholars have discussed how the Federal Circuit’s use of bright-line
rules provides certainty through the use of formalism,155 but adversely
impacts innovation.156 From that perspective, the Supreme Court’s
rejection of these rules may be viewed as a retreat from a particular type of
formalism. For example, Professor Timothy Holbrook has argued that the
Court has rejected substantive formalism in favor of process-based
formalism.157 Additionally, Professor Arti Rai has suggested that the
Court’s actions may be an attempt to promote more nuanced policy making
in the Federal Circuit. Professor Rai points out that the Supreme Court has
“emphasized the dynamic and evolving nature” of patent law,158 and that in
Festo, it noted that “[f]undamental alterations” in established (flexible)
rules “risk destroying the legitimate expectations of inventors in their
property.”159
153. Id. at 1303.
154. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007); see also Bilski v. Kappos,
130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010).
155. See John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 776
(2003) (“Adjudicative rule formalism counsels that lawmakers should, where possible, stipulate
bright-line rules instead of vague standards.”); Vertinsky, supra note 132, at 1620 (“Reliability and
predictability of patent rights are critical to facilitating private party contracts and bright-line rules
can be useful in enhancing predictability and strengthening property rights where managed
appropriately to allow for changes in technological needs and possibilities.”).
156. See Janice M. Mueller, The Evanescent Experimental Use Exemption from United States
Patent Infringement Liability: Implications for University and Nonprofit Research and
Development, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 917, 965 (2004) (“Despite the seeming attractiveness of precise
rules, nuanced and flexible standards are generally more appropriate for the dynamic innovation
environment confronted by the Federal Circuit.”); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A MultiInstitutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1040 (2003) (noting
that “bright-line rules cannot be expected to do a good job of furthering the innovation goals of
patent law” and that “even if certain bright-line rules could incorporate innovation policy goals to
some extent, the rules that the Federal Circuit has chosen do not appear to do so”).
157. Timothy R. Holbrook, Substantive Versus Process-Based Formalism in Claim
Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 123, 126–127, 129 (2005).
158. Rai, supra note 156, at 1119–20.
159. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 739 (2002).
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But scholars have only just begun to consider bright-line rules as a
form of substantive rulemaking. From this perspective, the rejection of
bright-line rules might be viewed as a response to the Federal Circuit
assuming an agency-like role. Although the procedure for creating brightline rules varies considerably from the notice-and-comment rulemaking
process, the effects of both types of rules are essentially the same.
1. Overview of Substantive Rulemaking
In administrative law, the distinction between substantive and nonsubstantive rulemaking is important because only substantive rules carry
the force of law,160 making them binding on both the agency and the
public.161 The APA defines “rule” as “the whole or a part of an agency
statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to
implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the
organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency.”162
According to the Federal Circuit, a substantive rule is broadly defined as
“action that is legislative in nature, is primarily concerned with policy
considerations for the future rather than the evaluation of past conduct, and
looks not to the evidentiary facts but to policy-making conclusions to be
drawn from the facts.”163
An agency cannot pass substantive rules unless (1) the agency has been
delegated authority to do so by Congress and (2) the agency follows proper
procedure under the APA.164 The vast majority of substantive rules are
passed through the notice-and-comment rulemaking process governed by
§ 553 of the APA.165 This provision allows an agency to propose a rule,166
and requires a commenting period for the public to provide input.167 The
agency will then take this input into account in issuing a final version of
the rule.168 The procedure provided by § 553 allows the public to provide
meaningful commentary, thereby (in theory) safeguarding the community

160. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 254 (2001) (observing that interpretations
such as opinion letters, policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines “lack the
force of law” and “do not warrant Chevron-style deference”).
161. See Coal. for Common Sense in Gov’t Procurement v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 464
F.3d 1306, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“The change in existing law affected by a substantive rule is
binding not only within the agency, but is also binding on tribunals outside the agency.”).
162. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2006).
163. Coal. for Common Sense, 464 F.3d. at 1317 (quoting Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Sec’y
of Veterans Affairs, 308 F.3d 1262, 1264–65 (Fed. Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
164. See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 226–27.
165. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
166. Id. § 553(b).
167. Id. § 553(c).
168. Id.
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against bad rules.169
Non-substantive rules, such as interpretive rules and policy statements,
are exempt from the notice-and-comment process.170 They do not have the
force of law, and consequently, these statements do not bind the agency or
the public.171 Policy statements merely communicate to the public how the
agency plans to exercise a discretionary power,172 whereas interpretive
rules tell the public how the agency interprets an existing statute or rule.173
Professor Mark Seidenfeld and others have argued that agencies ought
to be granted greater flexibility.174 As Professor Seidenfeld observes, the
Supreme Court has held that agencies are free to make policy through
rulemaking.175 Thus, an argument can be made that substantive rules need
not be bright-line in nature. At the same time, the traditional dichotomy is
that substantive rules tend to be rigid,176 whereas interpretive rules and
policy statements allow for flexibility.
2. Federal Circuit Substantive Rulemaking
Professor Ryan Vacca recently argued that when the Federal Circuit
acts en banc, it functions like an agency engaging in substantive
rulemaking.177 Professor Vacca claims that the Federal Circuit’s order for a
rehearing en banc constitutes a de facto notice-and-comment process,
169. See Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 236 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(discussing the importance of agencies’ providing all pertinent data and information to the public,
so that the public can provide “useful criticism” of the proposed rule (quoting Conn. Light & Power
Co. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 673 F.2d 525, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1982))).
170. Preminger v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 632 F.3d 1345, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
171. See Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (discussing the distinction between substantive and non-substantive rules).
172. According to the Attorney General’s Manual on the APA, a “policy statement” is a
statement “issued by an agency to advise the public prospectively of the manner in which the
agency proposes to exercise a discretionary power.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 30 n.3 (1947).
173. According to the Attorney General’s Manual on the APA, “interpretive rules” are “rules
or statements issued by an agency to advise the public of the agency’s construction of the statutes
and rules which it administers.” Id.
174. See Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency
Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 440–41 (1999).
175. Id. at 441 (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202–03 (1947); NLRB v. Bell
Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974)).
176. Indeed, a common criticism of agency rulemaking is that it is an “‘ossified’ . . .
decisionmaking process that is less flexible, less rational, and less effective” compared to
adjudication. David B. Spence & Lekha Gopalakrishnan, Bargaining Theory and Regulatory
Reform: The Political Logic of Inefficient Regulation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 599, 608 (2000) (quoting
Jody Freedman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 3.
(1997)).
177. Vacca, supra note 9, at 747–48.
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because amici can submit briefs to the court for a set period of time.178
But looking at the Federal Circuit cases discussed above, both panel
and en banc rules are equivalent to substantive rulemaking. The rules were
legislative-like, given that they were rigid and mandatory. They were also
forward-looking tests meant to bind lower courts, the PTO, and the public
at large. Although Professor Vacca is correct that only en banc decisions
offer any opportunity for public participation,179 rules issued through panel
decisions also bind parties like substantive rules.
There are several reasons to be uneasy with the Federal Circuit’s
bright-line substantive rulemaking. The Federal Circuit is an Article III
court whose judges are appointed for life.180 Consequently, if the public is
dissatisfied with any rule that the Federal Circuit enacts, there is no
mechanism by which to replace the judges. The PTO, by contrast, is part of
the Department of Commerce. The President can hold the Director of the
PTO accountable for bad choices, and the public can ultimately hold the
President accountable.
Bright-line rulemaking, moreover, permits very limited public input.
Members of the public can file amicus briefs in an attempt to sway the
Federal Circuit on a particular decision.181 And in at least one case, the
Federal Circuit appears to have reversed a decision because of public
backlash.182 Such public participation is substantially less effective than
public input during agency rulemaking. With judicial rulemaking, the
public never knows which appeal will give rise to a bright-line rule.
Moreover, filing an amicus brief is a more onerous task than filing a
comment regarding a proposed rule on a government website.
Agencies, however, are subject to rigid procedural requirements when
engaging in notice-and-comment rulemaking.183 They are required to
provide all relevant information and data to the public to ensure the
public’s full participation.184 Unlike amicus briefs, which a court can
178. Id. at 748.
179. Id. at 748–49.
180. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § I (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall
hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”); S. REP. NO. 97275, at 2–3 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11–12 (“Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit—The bill creates an article III court that is similar in structure to the eleven other courts of
appeals.”).
181. See Vacca, supra note 9, at 743–44.
182. See Kumar, supra note 2, at 1607–08 (discussing Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc.,
285 F.3d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2002), vacated, 323 F.3d 956, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
183. See 5 U.S.C § 553 (2006) (establishing procedural requirements for rulemaking); Merrill,
supra note 31, at 2155 (observing that modern administrative rulemaking is subject to rigid
procedural requirements in contrast to legislative statutemaking).
184. The Third Circuit recently noted that to ensure the public has been “fairly apprised of a
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ignore, an agency “must respond in a reasoned manner to the comments
received,” both “to explain how the agency resolved any significant
problems raised by the comments, and to show how that resolution led the
agency to the ultimate rule.”185
Agencies also have access to greater amounts of information than
appellate courts do.186 In issuing a bright-line rule, the Federal Circuit may
only rely upon the briefs submitted by the parties.187 In contrast, agencies
can consider numerous sources of information, such as studies and
information from hearings.188
But is the Federal Circuit at fault for using bright-line rules? By virtue
of failing to grant the PTO substantive rulemaking authority over the major
provisions of the Patent Act, Congress implicitly delegated interpretive
authority to the courts. In creating a semi-specialized court, Congress
further concentrated power in the Federal Circuit, allowing the expert court
to serve as a one-stop shop for clarification of the Patent Act.
Consequently, the Federal Circuit’s rulemaking does not appear to exceed
the authority granted to the court by Congress, although it may fail to
promote good policy. Indeed, an argument can be made that the Federal
Circuit has been put in an untenable situation, being charged with unifying
administrative law, yet being required to be deferential to agencies under
the APA.
III. FEDERAL CIRCUIT ADJUDICATION
The PTO has historically been a weak agency. Though § 2(a)(1) of the
Patent Act states that the PTO “shall be responsible for the granting and
issuing of patents,”189 it fails to grant the PTO substantive rulemaking
authority over the provisions of the Patent Act that govern patentability
new rule,” the court must ask “‘whether the purposes of notice and comment have been adequately
served.’” Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 652 F.3d 431, 449 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Am. Water
Works Ass’n v. EPA, 40 F.3d 1266, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). To achieve “an exchange of views,
information, and criticism” between the public and the agency, the agency “must disclose in detail
the thinking that has animated the form of a proposed rule and the data upon which that rule is
based” and it “has an obligation to make its views known to the public in a concrete and focused
form so as to make criticism or formulation of alternatives possible.” Id. (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35–36 (D.C. Cir. 1977)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
185. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp. v. EPA, 941 F.2d 1339, 1359 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting Action
on Smoking & Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 699 F.2d 1209, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1983)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
186. Frank H. Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion in Statutory Interpretation, 57 OKLA. L. REV.
1, 3 (2004).
187. See id.
188. Id.
189. 35 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1) (2006).
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requirements and infringement.190 Instead, the agency is limited to creating
procedures for implementing the statute.191
Whatever mistrust Congress had of the PTO in 1952 could have
subsided over time. With proper funding and guidance, the PTO could
have developed policymaking skills that would have allowed it to
successfully administer the statute. But the Federal Circuit picked up where
the framers of the Patent Act and the CCPA left off, continuing to weaken
and discredit the agency.
The Federal Circuit consistently misconstrues the APA and Supreme
Court precedent interpreting the APA with regard to patent cases. Among
the courts of appeal, the Federal Circuit stands alone in its attempt to
undermine administrative law. Admittedly, the court does generally
comply with the APA in reviewing non-patent agency decisions. But for
patent cases from the PTO and ITC, the court’s review resembles the nondeferential approach taken by the top level of an agency reviewing an
administrative law judge more than a federal court reviewing an executive
branch agency.192 This is particularly interesting given that the Federal
Circuit’s review of non-patent agencies appears to be quite deferential.193
190. See Tran, supra note 3, at 603.
191. Liza Vertinsky, Comparing Alternative Institutional Paths to Patent Reform, 61 ALA. L.
REV. 501, 535 (2010).
192. There is one notable exception: so-called Auer deference. The Supreme Court held that an
agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is granted controlling weight unless it is “plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted). In a recent opinion authored by Judge Timothy Dyk, the Federal Circuit
granted Auer deference to the PTO’s interpretation of one of its regulations, despite the fact that the
Federal Circuit had previously interpreted the same regulation differently. In re Lovin, 652 F.3d
1349, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (applying the “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation”
standard). In doing so, the court applied a Chevron-related Supreme Court case that “held that a
judicial interpretation would trump an agency’s construction only if the judicial precedent
‘unambiguously foreclose[d] the agency’s interpretation, and therefore contain[ed] no gap for the
agency to fill.’” Id. at 1354 (alteration in original) (quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v.
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983 (2005)). The Federal Circuit could have attempted to
distinguish between Chevron and Auer deference, but it instead appropriately deferred to the PTO.
193. For example, the Federal Circuit has been willing to apply Chevron and Skidmore
deference to non-patent agencies. See Keener v. United States, 551 F.3d 1358, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (granting Chevron deference to the Treasury regulation interpreting I.R.C. § 7422); Patterson
v. Dep’t of the Interior, 424 F.3d 1151, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (granting Chevron deference to the
Office of Personnel Management); Tunik v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 407 F.3d 1326, 1336 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (granting Chevron deference to the Merit Systems Protection Board’s interpretation of 5
U.S.C. § 7521); Brownlee v. Dyncorp, 349 F.3d 1343, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (granting Chevron
deference to the Secretary of Defense’s interpretation of Federal Acquisition Regulation);
Shakeproof Assembly Components, Div. of Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. United States, 268 F.3d 1376,
1381 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Even where [the Department of] Commerce has not engaged in notice-andcomment rulemaking, its statutory interpretations articulated in the course of antidumping
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Section A of this Part looks at the Federal Circuit’s attempts to
disregard the judicial review provision of the APA with respect to the
PTO. Section B discusses the Federal Circuit’s practice of construing
questions of fact as those of law so it can review them de novo. Section C
argues that the Federal Circuit has deliberately misinterpreted Supreme
Court precedent so it can affirm PTO decisions on alternate grounds.
Finally, Section D discusses how the Federal Circuit’s non-deferential
treatment of patent agencies extends to the ITC.
A. Applicability of the Administrative Procedure Act
While Congress debated the APA, patent attorneys and the Patent
Office fought against additional control and oversight, but both were
ultimately unsuccessful.194 For example, the American Bar Association’s
Special Committee on Administrative Law195 issued a proposal in 1935,
and again in 1936, that the jurisdictional functions of the Court of Claims,
the Board of Tax Appeals, the Customs Court, and the CCPA be combined
into a single administrative court.196 A representative for the Patent and
Trademark Section of the American Bar Association testified against the
proposal and expressly asked that patents be “let alone.”.197
The 1939 Walter–Logan bill was a rigid predecessor to the APA that
attempted to dramatically formalize agency process.198 The bill contained
an explicit exception for the Patent Office, likely because it was
established in 1836—well before the New Deal.199 President Franklin
Roosevelt vetoed that bill in 1940.200

proceedings draw Chevron deference.” (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230–31
(2001))); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bell & Howell Document Mgmt. Prods. Co., 994 F.2d 1569, 1571
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (granting Chevron deference to the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board’s
interpretation of Lanham Act). In contrast, the court has not granted the PTO Skidmore deference
for its interpretations of the Patent Act and has been reluctant to grant Chevron deference to ITC
patent decisions.
194. The Patent Office was renamed the Patent and Trademark Office in 1975. Pub. L. 93-596,
Sec. 1, 88 Stat. 1949 (Jan. 2, 1975).
195. The ABA’s Special Committee was established in 1933 in response to the bar’s concern
with the growing administrative state. See Shepherd, supra note 19, at 1569–70 (noting that “[t]he
committee professed to take no position on the desirability of the New Deal” but that their 1933
report “expressed indirectly the organized bar's opposition to the New Deal.”)
196. Id. at 1575.
197. 1936 A.B.A. Ann. Rep. 234 (statement of Thomas E. Robertson).
198. PETER WOLL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE INFORMAL PROCESS 19 (1963).
199. Shepherd, supra note 19, at 1618–19 tbl.1.
200. Presidential Veto Message, Walter-Logan Bill, reprinted in 86 Cong. Rec. 13943 (1940)
(“Today in sustaining American ideals of justice, an ounce of action is worth more than a pound of
argument. For these reasons I return the bill without my approval. Franklin D. Roosevelt.”).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

31

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 5

260

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

In 1941, The Senate Judiciary Committee considered three bills
addressing administrative procedural reform.201 The Patent Office was the
sole agency to seek an exemption from the bills,202 which failed to pass.203
As Professor George Shepherd notes, with the exception of the Patent
Office, “[i]t appears that agencies understood—and that the Roosevelt
administration had made clear to them—that some form of procedural
reform was inevitable.”204 The remaining agencies “now sought to shape
[the APA] and soften it.”205
An early version of the McCarran–Sumners bill, which was drafted in
1943, excluded patent cases from the judicial review chapter;206 however,
Congress struck that exemption. When the McCarran–Sumners bill passed
as the Administrative Procedure Act, it contained no individual agency
exceptions.207
The Federal Circuit, like the CCPA before it, refused to recognize that
the APA had altered the judicial review standard for PTO decisions.208
Although the CCPA never explicitly held that the APA was inapplicable to
appeals from the PTO’s Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI),
it neither applied the statute nor acknowledged the possibility of its
applicability.209 In 1997, the court stated: “The APA’s more deferential
standards of review have never been applicable to the Board’s decisions
and we are not persuaded to change this practice.”210 The court observed
that it could not change its standard without the full court’s review.211
The opportunity for en banc review of the Federal Circuit’s practice
came in the 1998 decision In re Zurko.212 The unanimous court
acknowledged that the Patent Commissioner had “campaigned
201. Shepherd, supra note 19, at 1638.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1638, 1641.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See id. at 1649 (discussing the introduction of the McCarran-Sumners bill); (92 Cong.
Rec. 2162 (1946) (statement of Allen Moore) (discussing how the bill contained exceptions for the
Bureau of the Internal Revenue and Patent Office).
207. See Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (exempting no
agencies from the provisions of the statute); In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1452 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(noting the Commissioner’s argument that the final version of the APA contained no explicit
exception for the Patent Office), rev’d sub nom. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 165 (1999).
208. See, e.g., In re Lueders, 111 F.3d 1569, 1574–78 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that history
does not support applying the APA’s more deferential standards of review to findings of fact).
209. See, e.g., In re Kunzmann, 326 F.2d 424, 426 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (upholding the examiner’s
findings because the appellant “failed to demonstrate that the examiner’s finding in this regard was
clearly erroneous”).
210. Lueders, 111 F.3d at 1575.
211. Id. at 1574.
212. In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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aggressively” for the court to review the BPAI’s factual findings under the
substantial evidence standard from § 706 of the APA.213 The court
nevertheless held that the less deferential “clearly erroneous” standard was
appropriate for reviewing issues of patent validity appealed from the
BPAI.214
The Federal Circuit relied on § 559 of the APA to support the position
that the Patent Office was exempt from § 706.215 Section 559 states that the
judicial review provisions in the APA “do not limit or repeal additional
requirements imposed by statute or otherwise recognized by law.”216 The
Federal Circuit interpreted this provision to preserve standards of judicial
review that “evolved as a matter of common law, rather than compelling
that all such standards of review be displaced” by the APA.217
Even if this interpretation of § 559 is correct, the court’s attempt to
circumvent § 706 was, at best, creative. The court first pointed to
legislative history for early drafts of the APA that Congress did not enact.
For example, the Federal Circuit observed that the failed Walter–Logan
Bill exempted the Patent Office from the APA.218 It likewise noted the
Senate Judiciary Committee’s statement that the McCarran–Sumners
bill created an exemption for “matters subject to a subsequent trial of
the law and the facts de novo in any court,” such as “the work of the
Patent Office.” 219 This language, however, referred to the early version
of the bill that contained an explicit exception; 220 no such language
213. Id. at 1449.
214. Id. at 1459.
215. Id. at 1452 (“This history suggests that Congress drafted the APA to apply to agencies
generally, but that because of existing common law standards and the availability of trial de novo
pursuant to section 4915 of the Revised Statutes, the predecessor of 35 U.S.C. § 145, Congress did
not intend the APA to alter the review of substantive Patent Office decisions.”).
Note that the legislative history that the Federal Circuit used to support the Zurko decision
speaks equally to the Customs Service. As with the Patent Office, the creation of the Customs
Service long precedes the New Deal and has a history of operating without direct judicial oversight.
Both agencies provide opportunities for an appeal from an agency decision to a trial court for de
novo review. But in 1981, the CCPA cited to the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), and held that past CCPA precedent was “no
longer controlling in view of the Administrative Procedure Act which authorizes judicial review to
determine whether agency action, findings, and conclusions are arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise
not in accordance with the law.” Farrell Lines, Inc. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1214, 1217 n.7.5
(C.C.P.A. 1981) (citation omitted), overruling Waterman S.S. Corp. v. United States, 30 C.C.P.A.
119 (1942). Given that the CCPA directly reviewed Customs Service decisions, one would have
expected this decision to be relevant precedent for the Federal Circuit in determining how to review
BPAI decisions.
216. 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2006).
217. In re Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1452.
218. Id. at 1451.
219. Id. at 1451 (quoting 92 Cong. Rec. 2162 (1946)).
220. 92 Cong. Rec. 2162 (1946).
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appeared in the final version of the bill that passed.221
The court then claimed that the reason such language did not appear in
the final bill was “likely that Congress viewed an explicit exception for the
Patent Office as redundant in light of the ‘otherwise recognized by law’
exception” under § 559.222 The court disregarded the fact that most
agencies quit seeking exemptions not because of statutory redundancy, but
because procedural reform was inevitable.223
The Federal Circuit also supported its position based on the history of
the Patent Act, which set no standard of review.224 The court observed that
the CCPA never applied § 706 judicial review standards in reviewing the
PTO.225 Although it conceded that no single common law standard of
review existed for PTO decisions, the court held that this lack of
consistency established an additional requirement recognized by law.226 It
furthermore made a stare decisis argument based on the fact that the CCPA
had never applied standards from § 706, even though the CCPA had failed
to consistently apply any other standard.227
Ultimately, the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit.228 The
Court noted that “[t]he APA was meant to bring uniformity to a field full
of variation and diversity” and that “[i]t would frustrate that purpose to
permit divergence on the basis of a requirement ‘recognized’ only as
ambiguous.”229 It observed that the CCPA failed to apply a consistent
judicial review standard, and found that the CCPA’s failure to apply the
APA was not dispositive.230
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, joined by Justices Anthony M.
Kennedy and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented, arguing that the APA raised
the minimum standard of review for agencies and that courts could
establish more searching standards.231 Chief Justice Rehnquist argued:
In making this determination, I would defer, not to agencies in
general as the Court does today, but to the Court of Appeals
221. See Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (making no
reference to “patent”).
222. Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1452.
223. See Shepherd, supra note 19, at 1638 (noting that agencies came to realize “that some
form of procedural reform was inevitable” and that their best option was to “shape it and soften
it.”).
224. See Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1453–57 (examining the history of the Patent Act).
225. Id. at 1455 (“Following Congress’ enactment of the APA, the CCPA continued to review
Patent Office decisions as it had done before, without a clearly articulated standard of review.”).
226. Id. at 1454, 1459 (recognizing “the clear error standard” as an additional requirement).
227. See id. at 1454, 1457–58.
228. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 165 (1999).
229. Id. at 155.
230. See id.
231. Id. at 170–71 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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for the Federal Circuit, the specialized Article III court
charged with review of patent appeals. In this case the
unanimous en banc Federal Circuit and the patent bar both
agree that these cases recognized the “clearly erroneous”
standard as an “additional requirement” placed on the PTO
beyond the APA’s minimum procedures. I see no reason to
reject their sensible and plausible resolution of the issue.232
In taking this approach, the dissent treated the Federal Circuit as the
administrator of the Patent Act, and acted as though the issue of deference
turned solely on expertise. The Federal Circuit’s application of the Chenery
doctrine, discussed below, further illustrates the fallacy of viewing
deference solely as an issue of expertise.233
Even after the Supreme Court’s intervention, the Federal Circuit
continued to minimize deference to the PTO. Courts are supposed to
review questions of fact from informal proceedings under the highly
deferential arbitrary and capricious review standard.234 In contrast, courts
review questions of fact from formal adjudication or rulemaking under the
slightly less deferential substantial evidence standard, focusing on the
formal record.235
PTO proceedings are informal in that they do not comply with §§ 556
and 557 of the APA.236 Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit announced that
the substantial evidence standard was appropriate, despite the lack of
formal process.237 The reasoning for the court’s decision hinged on the
language of § 706(2)(E) of the APA, which states that a reviewing court
should set aside agency actions that are “unsupported by substantial
evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise
reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute.”238
The Federal Circuit focused on the second part of the phrase. The court
maintained that § 144 of the Patent Act states that the court “shall review
the decision from which an appeal is taken on the record before the Patent

232. Id. at 171.
233. See infra Section III.C.
234. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006); see also Arti K. Rai, Allocating Power Over Fact-Finding
in the Patent System, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 907, 916 (2004) (“Substantial evidence review,
which focuses on evidence within the four corners of the agency record, applies to formal agency
proceedings; arbitrary and capricious review applies to informal proceedings.”) (citations omitted).
235. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2006); see also Rai, supra note 234.
236. See In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1314, 1315 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Rai, supra note 234,
at 916 (noting that PTO proceedings are informal).
237. Gartside, 203 F.3d at 1313.
238. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2006).
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and Trademark Office,”239 and that the substantial evidence standard was
therefore appropriate.240 In drawing this distinction, the court claimed that
substantial evidence is much less deferential than arbitrary and capricious
review.241
Yet the Supreme Court in Zurko disagreed with this claim, citing to a
D.C. Circuit case with a parenthetical explaining that there is “no
difference” between the two standards “as applied to court review of
agency factfinding.”242 This perceived lack of distinction may be the reason
why the Court declined to decide which standard applied.243
B. The Manipulation of Questions of Law and Fact
The level of deference that an agency receives for its decisions turns on
whether the question the agency considered was one of law or fact. Courts
review questions of law de novo, granting no deference to the agency.244 In
contrast, as noted above, courts review questions of fact deferentially, and
affirm a high percentage of such agency decisions.245
The Supreme Court has recognized that the nature of the distinction
between law and fact is “vexing,”246 and that “the appropriate methodology
for distinguishing” such questions “has been, to say the least, elusive.”247
Professor Craig Nard observed that law and fact often overlap, resulting in
a third category of mixed questions of law and fact.248 Even more
problematic than blurred dividing lines is the fact that courts can exploit
the distinction to reduce deference to agencies.
239. 35 U.S.C. § 144 (2006).
240. Gartside, 203 F.3d at 1313.
241. Id. at 1312.
242. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 158 (1999) (citing Ass’n of Data Processing Serv.
Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 683–84 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
243. See Rai, supra note 234, at 917 (noting that “[t]he Court probably did not contemplate the
liberties that the Federal Circuit would take with the legal gap left open by the Zurko decision” and
observing that Justice Stephen Breyer indicated during oral argument that arbitrary and capricious
review might be most appropriate).
244. Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 615–16
(2007) (“Article III presumptively demands that the reviewing courts be able to exercise de novo
judgment about questions of law and about factual disputes on which constitutional rights turn, but
Congress usually can require courts to give great weight to the agencies’ other factual
determinations.”).
245. See FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 53 (2007)
(finding that courts of appeals affirm agency decisions in 75% of cases under arbitrary and
capricious review and in 70% of cases under substantial evidence review). Note, however, that this
study looks at all courts of appeal and not just the Federal Circuit.
246. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982).
247. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113 (1985).
248. Nard, supra note 84, at 1424 (“[L]aw and fact often overlap, forming a third category
called mixed questions of law and fact or law application to fact.”).
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Professor Arti Rai and others observe that the Federal Circuit exploits
the distinction between law and fact to minimize deference to the PTO.249
Facts are central to patent law issues such as infringement, claim scope,
and validity.250 Questions of fact in informal proceedings, like those in the
PTO, should be affirmed unless they are “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an
abuse of discretion.”251 Yet the Federal Circuit engages in what Professor
Rai refers to as “alchemy”—turning facts into law252 by construing
questions that involve mixed issues of law and fact, such as claim
construction, as “pure questions of law.”253 The court then reviews the
agency decision de novo instead of granting proper deference to PTO factfinding.
One might argue that the Federal Circuit should review fact-finding de
novo, given its comparative expertise. But of the ten active judges currently
on the bench, only three appear to possess technical degrees: Judges
Newman (Ph.D. Chemistry),254 Lourie (Ph.D. Chemistry),255 and Moore
(B.S.E.E., M.S. ).256 This still leaves large gaps in scientific knowledge,
such as computer science, biology, and physics.257 In contrast, all PTO
examiners possess at least a technical undergraduate degree,258 and
administrative law judges on the BPAI additionally possess a J.D. and
“comprehensive patent experience” in a desired technical area.259
249. Arti K. Rai, Specialized Trial Courts: Concentrating Expertise on Fact, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 877, 883 (2002) (discussing “the Federal Circuit’s [a]lchemy” of turning questions of
fact into questions of law); see also Thomas O. Sargentich, The Supreme Court’s Administrative
Law Jurisprudence, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 273, 284 (1993) (observing that “the line between law
and policy is highly manipulable” and that “[m]atters can be seen as questions of law when we want
them to be decided by courts, and they often can be seen as issues of policy when we want
deference to agencies”).
250. Rai, supra note 249, at 881.
251. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
252. Rai, supra note 249.
253. Id.
254. Biography of Pauline Newman, IP HANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICES, http://www.iphand
book.org/handbook/authors/A132/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2012).
255. See supra note 108.
256. See Biography of Kimberly A. Moore, supra note 106.
257. See Rai, supra note 249, at 888 (noting that only a few Federal Circuit judges have
technical training and that there are gaps in their expertise).
258. See Patent Examiner Positions, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/pac/exam.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2012) (stating that the minimum qualification for
an entry-level GS-5 position is the completion of all requirements for a bachelor’s degree in
engineering, chemistry, microbiology, physics, biology, or design; several fields also require a
minimum number of hours of coursework in the major).
259. See, e.g., Job Listing for Administrative Patent Judge, USAJOBS, http://www.usa
jobs.gov/GetJob/ViewDetails/306360900 (follow “viewed” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 29, 2012);
see also 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2006) (“The administrative patent judges shall be persons of competent
legal knowledge and scientific ability . . . .”).
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Part of the problem is that whether a patent issue is a question of law or
fact impacts review of both agency and trial court decisions. Given that
trial court judges generally do not have patent expertise, some might prefer
that the Federal Circuit aggressively construe issues as questions of law, in
order to trigger de novo review.260
But even if the Federal Circuit is motivated by limiting the power of
unskilled trial court judges, it is also taking power away from the executive
branch. Consider, for example, the issue of claim construction. In the
Supreme Court’s Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. decision, the
Court held that claim construction is an issue for the judge.261 In dicta,
however, the Court noted that claim construction is a “mongrel
practice.”262 It further noted, pragmatically, that for an issue that “falls
somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact,
the fact/law distinction at times has turned on a determination that, as a
matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better
positioned than another to decide the issue in question.”263 Here, the Court
noted, judges “are the better suited to find the acquired meaning of patent
terms” than juries,264 and argued that this would promote uniformity in
patent law.265
Many scholars have argued that the Supreme Court’s decision supports
the idea that claim construction is a mixed question of law and fact,266
which leads to the observation that judges should receive deference for
such decisions.267 Nevertheless, in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc.,
the en banc Federal Circuit held that “claim construction is purely a matter
of law,” and is subject to de novo review.268
260. Note, however, that even a nonexpert district court judge will have the benefit of having
heard testimony firsthand, rather than reviewing a cold record. Therein lies a fundamental problem
with the patent litigation system—the failure to employ specialized trial courts. Congress could
have achieved uniformity in the patent system by coupling special trial court judges modeled after
the bankruptcy system with a strong patent agency with full rulemaking authority.
261. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376, 391 (1996).
262. Id. at 378.
263. Id. at 388 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 390–91.
266. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal
Circuit Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 824–25 (2008) (describing claim construction
as a mixed question of law and fact); Kathleen M. O’Malley et al., A Panel Discussion: Claim
Construction from the Perspective of the District Judge, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671, 674 (2004)
(arguing that under Markman, the Supreme Court deemed claim construction to be “a mixed
question of law and fact”).
267. See Rai, supra note 249, at 887 (discussing why de novo review of fact-laden decisions
harms uniformity).
268. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs. Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454–55 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The issue of
whether claim construction should be viewed as a question of whether district courts should be
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A direct consequence of the Cybor decision is that ITC claim
construction is reviewed de novo, notwithstanding the fact that there is no
jury in ITC proceedings, nor are there Markman hearings. Consequently,
the Federal Circuit’s decision to make claim construction a pure question
of law not only took power away from the district courts, but also from the
executive branch.
By construing mixed questions as those of pure law, the Federal Circuit
acts more like the top level of an agency than an Article III court.
Commissioners that head agencies often have wide discretion to reverse
decisions made by administrative law judges. For example, Commissioners
of the ITC can reverse an ALJ’s decision on any ground, without
deference.269 The Federal Circuit appears to want this level of discretion
for itself, without the limitations of an agency.
C. The Chenery Doctrine
In the 1940s, the Supreme Court decided two cases, known as Chenery
I and Chenery II, which set a new standard for courts that affirm agency
decisions.270 Although the cases are now quite old, their holding that courts
cannot substitute their own judgment when affirming an agency is still
good law. Patent scholars have paid scant attention to the doctrine,271
notwithstanding a recent case in which the Federal Circuit circumvented
the decisions to minimize deference to the PTO.272
entitled to deference for claim constructions remains divisive. In Retractable Technologies, Inc. v.
Becton, Dickinson and Co., the court reiterated that claim construction is to be reviewed de novo.
653 F.3d 1296, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2011). A petition for hearing en banc was denied, but Judge Moore,
joined by Judge Rader, dissented, stating: “It is time to rethink the deference we give to district
court claim constructions and the fallacy that the entire process is one of law.” 659 F.3d 1369, 1373
(Moore, J. dissenting). Judge O’Malley maintained that “[i]t is time to revisit and reverse our
decision in Cybor Corp.” Id. at 1373 (O’Malley, J. dissenting).
269. 19 C.F.R. § 210.45(c) (2012) (stating that “the Commission may affirm, reverse, modify,
set aside or remand” an ALJ’s initial determination “for further proceedings”).
A similar dynamic exists for many Article I courts. For example, although special trial
judges of the Tax Court “perform more than ministerial tasks,” “they lack authority to [issue] final
decision[s].” Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881–82 (1991). An open question remains as to
why Congress granted the CCPA (and subsequently, the Federal Circuit) Article III status.
270. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) [hereinafter Chenery II]; SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943) [hereinafter Chenery I].
271. The only scholarly discussion of the Chenery doctrine in relation to patent law prior to
this Article is in an amicus brief that was filed in Dickinson v. Zurko and was later republished. See
Thomas G. Field, Jr. et al., Dickinson v. Zurko: An Amicus Brief, 4 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
49, 57–61 (2000) (observing that the Federal Circuit’s decision in In re Zurko violates the Chenery
doctrine). Subsequently, Amy Motomura has written about the Federal Circuit’s misapplication of
the Chenery decisions. See Amy Motomura, Rethinking the Chenery Doctrine (draft on file with
author).
272. See In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 973–75 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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1. The Chenery Decisions
When an appellate court reviews a district court decision, the appellate
court is permitted to affirm the decision on grounds other than what the
district court considered.273 The district court’s basis for its decision is not
dispositive. Judicial review of agency adjudication, however, is far more
restricted. In the Supreme Court’s 1943 decision SEC v. Chenery (Chenery
I), the SEC considered whether a corporation’s management owes a
fiduciary duty to all of its affected securities holders.274 The SEC
determined that although “the management does not hold stock . . . in trust
for the stockholders,” it owes them a “duty of fair dealing.”275
In reviewing the SEC’s actions, the Supreme Court drew a sharp
distinction between reviewing district court decisions and reviewing
agency decisions. The Court held that “in reviewing the decision of a lower
court, it must be affirmed if the result is correct ‘although the lower court
relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason.’”276 The Court
explained:
The reason for this rule is obvious. It would be wasteful to
send a case back to a lower court to reinstate a decision which
it had already made but which the appellate court concluded
should properly be based on another ground within the power
of the appellate court to formulate.277
Thus, appellate courts may affirm district courts on a different basis than
what the district court used for reasons of judicial economy.
In contrast, the Supreme Court did not find that judicial economy was a
driving force in appellate review of agency adjudication. The Court
observed that for such decisions, review is more analogous to that of jury
decisions, and noted: “The grounds upon which an administrative order
must be judged are those upon which the record discloses that its action
was based.”278 It then articulated what scholars have characterized as a
“fundamental principle of administrative law”:279

273. Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 88 (“[W]e do not disturb the settled rule that, in reviewing the
decision of a lower court, it must be affirmed if the result is correct ‘although the lower court relied
upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason.’”) (quoting Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245
(1937)).
274. Id. at 87.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 88 (quoting Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245 (1937)).
277. Id. at 88.
278. Id. at 87.
279. Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J.
1032, 1042 (2011).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss1/5

40

Kumer: The Accidental Agency?

2013]

THE ACCIDENTAL AGENCY?

269

If an order is valid only as a determination of policy or
judgment which the agency alone is authorized to make and
which it has not made, a judicial judgment cannot be made to
do service for an administrative judgment. For purposes of
affirming no less than reversing its orders, an appellate court
cannot intrude upon the domain which Congress has
exclusively entrusted to an administrative agency.280
Four years later, in a case also called S.E.C. v. Chenery (Chenery II),
the Court reiterated that in judging a decision that the “administrative
agency alone is authorized to make,” the court “must judge the propriety of
such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency.”281 Thus, the
reviewing court is constrained because it cannot take power away from the
agency. Only the agency has the power to select the basis for its decision.
This holding has been reaffirmed in more recent Supreme Court
decisions,282 and has been applied to agency decisions that arise from
informal adjudication.283
2. The Federal Circuit’s Application of Chenery
In the past, the Federal Circuit occasionally heeded the Chenery
decisions. For example, the In re Thrift court found that the BPAI did not
provide an adequate basis for rejecting a claim.284 The court then vacated
and remanded the decision back to the BPAI.285 Although the agency
provided additional reasons for its rejection of the claim at trial, the court
maintained that under the Chenery decisions, a ground that does not appear
in the BPAI’s decision could not be the basis for affirmance.286
Likewise, in the Veterans Appeals case Mayfield v. Nicholson, the
court found that the agency’s decision could not be affirmed on other

280. Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 88 (emphasis added). Likewise, the Court noted a few years later
that to do otherwise “would propel the court into the domain which Congress has set aside
exclusively for the administrative agency.” Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 196.
281. 332 U.S. at 196.
282. See Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 186 (2006) (applying Chenery I, and noting that
appellate courts are “not generally empowered to conduct a de novo inquiry into the matter being
reviewed and to reach its own conclusions based on such an inquiry,” but rather, should “remand to
the agency for additional investigation or explanation” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983) (“It is
well-established that an agency’s action must be upheld, if at all, on the basis articulated by the
agency itself.”).
283. See, e.g., Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 139, 143 (1973) (applying the Chenery doctrine to
informal adjudication).
284. In re Thrift, 298 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
285. Id.
286. Id. at 1366–67.
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grounds, even though most of the facts were undisputed.287 The
government argued that the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
applied the relevant statute and regulation to the undisputed facts of the
case, and therefore “did not make a determination or judgment which an
administrative agency alone is authorized to make.”288 The court disagreed,
noting that the absence of a factual dispute did not reduce the agency’s
analysis to “a mechanical comparison” of the statute, the regulation, and
the disability letter at issue.289 An agency’s decision instead “turns on what
inferences the agency draws from the facts before it.”290 In other words, the
issue was not a pure question of law, even though it had undisputed facts.
In 2009, however, the Federal Circuit changed its approach. In the In re
Comiskey decision, the BPAI affirmed the patent examiner’s finding that a
method was unpatentable under § 103 of the Patent Act.291 On appeal, the
Federal Circuit affirmed the BPAI, but on the basis that § 101 was not
met.292
The Federal Circuit stated that “the Supreme Court made clear that a
reviewing court can (and should) affirm an agency decision on a legal
ground not relied on by the agency, if there is no issue of fact, policy, or
agency expertise.”293 The Federal Circuit supported this assertion with a
statement by the Supreme Court that a review of a district court decision
should not be remanded when the appellate court would affirm on a
different basis.294 The Federal Circuit omitted the fact that the Supreme
Court was making a distinction between the review of district court
decisions and the review of agency decisions; it furthermore disregarded
the comparison of agency adjudication to jury verdicts.
The court also quoted the portion of Chenery I that states: “If an order
is valid only as a determination of policy or judgment which the agency
alone is authorized to make and which it has not made, a judicial judgment
cannot be made to do service for an administrative judgment.”295 The
Federal Circuit concluded that when the agency decision at issue is a
question of law, with no disputed underlying factual issues, the issue is a
determination of neither policy nor judgment. The court asserted that in
such circumstances, Chenery “not only permits [it] to supply a new legal
ground for affirmance, but encourages such a resolution” where “[i]t would
287. Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328, 1334–35 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
288. Id. at 1335 (internal quotation marks omitted).
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 969 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
292. Id. at 969. For reasons unknown, Judge Paul Michel signed onto the opinions in both
Mayfield and In re Comiskey. Id.; Mayfield, 444 F.3d at 1329.
293. Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 974.
294. Id. (quoting Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 88).
295. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 88).
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be wasteful to send the case back to the agency for a determination as to
patentable subject matter.”296 The court supported its position using only
Federal Circuit cases.
At no point, however, has the Supreme Court distinguished among
questions of fact, mixed questions of fact and law, and pure questions of
law in holding that agency decisions cannot be affirmed on alternative
grounds. Indeed, the original decision involved a question of law;297 only
later did other courts extend the original decision to fact-finding and
statements of reason.298
The little precedent that is consistent with the Federal Circuit’s position
is based on faulty or inapplicable reasoning. The Fourth Circuit held that a
case did not present a Chenery problem “because the question of
interpretation of a federal statute is not ‘a determination or judgment which
an administrative agency alone is authorized to make.’”299 The Fourth
Circuit cited to a district court opinion that noted: “We are interpreting the
scope of a federal statute and this task is not peculiar to an administrative
agency.”300 In contrast, Congress has authorized the PTO to grant and
reject patent applications. Although the PTO must interpret the Patent Act
to determine whether to grant a patent, such interpretations relate to the
task that Congress entrusted the PTO with.
The Eighth Circuit has interpreted the Chenery decisions as limited to
determinations of law.301 However, this decision, like In re Comiskey,
reads the Supreme Court cases too narrowly. The Chenery decisions make
clear that the doctrine is inapplicable only when a statute compels the
agency’s action.302 But as the Mayfield decision illustrates, having a
296. Id. at 975 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 88).
297. Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 956
(2007) (“The Chenery decision itself involved review of a formal adjudication, in which the SEC
had relied upon erroneous legal principles to justify a decision that might have been sustained on
other grounds.”); Amy R. Motomura, Rethinking the Chenery Doctrine, at 14 (draft on file with
author) (observing that the Chenery decisions “involved a legal error by the SEC”).
298. Stack, supra note 297, at 956.
299. N.C. Comm’n of Indian Affairs v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 725 F.2d 238, 240 (4th Cir.
1984); see also Overseas Educ. Ass’n v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 827 F.2d 814, 818 n.1 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (“It is absurd to suppose that [Chenery I] requires the Authority or a court adjudicating a
question of law to order an agency to do that which the law forbids because the agency overlooked
the point, and Chenery has never been put to so perverse a use.”).
300. N.C. Comm’n of Indian Affairs, 725 F.2d at 240 (citing Milk Transp., Inc. v. Interstate
Commerce Comm’n, 190 F. Supp. 350, 355 (D. Minn. 1960), aff’d per curiam, 368 U.S. 5 (1961));
see also Motomura, supra note 297 at 12 (discussing the Fourth Circuit’s decision).
301. Arkansas AFL-CIO v. FCC, 11 F.3d 1430, 1440 (8th Cir. 1993). See also Motomura,
supra note 297 at 13 (discussing the Eighth Circuit’s decision).
302. See Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 95 F.3d 1094, 1099–1102 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(affirming a Department of Commerce antidumping proceeding where the only issue was one of
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question of law does not automatically make this the case.303
Likewise, the key issue in In re Comiskey was whether the BPAI was
compelled to hold that the invention was not patentable under § 101 of the
Patent Act or whether its decision turned on inferences drawn from the
facts or on issues of policy. Section 101 sparsely states: “Whoever invents
or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.”304 Neither § 101 nor its legislative history provides guidance for
what constitutes a process, machine, manufacture, or the like.305
As the Supreme Court’s fractured opinion in Bilski v. Kappos
illustrates, what constitutes patentable subject matter is far from a
mechanical comparison of the claim at issue to § 101.306 It involves policyladen determinations of what types of inventions merit protection and the
technical expertise to determine whether an invention is new and useful.307
The PTO must make these policy determinations to do the job that was
entrusted to it by Congress. It is thus unclear how the Federal Circuit can
justify circumventing the Chenery decisions.

statutory construction, and the “plain language of the statute compel[led] the conclusion”); see also
Stack, supra note 297, at 965–66 (discussing the limits of Chenery).
303. See supra notes 287–90 and accompanying text.
304. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
305. See Dennis Crouch & Robert P. Merges, Operating Efficiently Post-Bilski by Ordering
Patent Doctrine Decision-Making, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1673, 1677 (2010) (“The literal terms
of § 101—‘process, machine, manufacture and composition of matter’—are so open-ended that they
provide very little traction for a court that feels the need to [rein] in the scope of patentable subject
matter.”); Robert A. Kreiss, Patent Protection for Computer Programs and Mathematical
Algorithms: The Constitutional Limitations on Patentable Subject Matter, 29 N.M. L. REV. 31, 57
(1999) (“The legislative history regarding the meaning of the terms in § 101 provides no guidance
in determining the meaning of those words as terms of art.”).
306. Sapna Kumar, The Bilski Decision: What Does it Mean for the Future of Business
Method and Software Patents?, COMP. L. REV. INT. (August 15, 2010).
307. The Supreme Court had initially shied away from weighing in too heavily on policy issues
surrounding patentable subject matter. In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), the Court
explicitly noted that policy concerns regarding safety were best left to the legislative process. Id. at
317 (“The choice we are urged to make is a matter of high policy for resolution within the
legislative process after the kind of investigation, examination, and study that legislative bodies can
provide and courts cannot. That process involves the balancing of competing values and interests,
which in our democratic system is the business of elected representatives.”). But in Bilski v.
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010), the Supreme Court directly confronted the policy debate on how to
promote innovation through defining what constitutes patentable subject matter. Compare id. at
3227 (Kennedy, J., plurality) (arguing that, although patents were initially not given out for
inventions that fail the machine-or-transformation test, “times change” and “[t]echnology and other
innovations progress in unexpected ways”), with id. at 3254 (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment) (arguing that business method patents do not promote innovation).
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The In re Comiskey decision has arguably allowed the Federal Circuit
to maintain uniformity in patent law. It allows the court to clarify to the
public what the court believes are inadequacies in the claimed invention,
rather than letting the PTO have the final word. This is more efficient than
repeatedly remanding decisions back to the PTO until the agency agrees
with the court’s reasoning.
But there are numerous problems with the Federal Circuit’s heavyhanded review of PTO rejections. As Judge Laurence Silberman of the
D.C. Circuit has noted, the idea that the judicial branch cannot intrude
upon the domain that Congress has entrusted to the agency stems “from
proper respect for the separation of powers among the branches of
government.”308 When Congress entrusts adjudicative power to an
administrative agency, it entrusts it to the executive branch. Consequently,
when the Federal Circuit substitutes its own judgment for that of the PTO,
it takes for itself power that Congress properly delegated to the executive
branch and thereby violates separation of powers.
Such usurpation of executive branch discretion is troubling from an
institutional-design perspective. As an executive branch entity, the PTO is
politically accountable.309 Consequently, if the PTO adopted a policy
contrary to that of the current administration, the Director could face
removal by the President. If the public is displeased with the PTO’s
actions, the public has the opportunity to vote the current President out of
office. Furthermore, Congress can exert oversight by controlling the PTO’s
budget, subjecting PTO officials to hearings, and refusing to confirm the
President’s choice for Director.310
308. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. IRS, 792 F.2d 153, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Silberman, J.,
concurring); see also Bhattarai v. Holder, 408 Fed. App’x 212, 221 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Chenery’s
rule thus secures the separation of powers among the three branches.”); Richard E. Levy & Robert
L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEX. L. REV. 499, 504 (2011) (“In SEC v. Chenery
Corp., for example, the Court drew on separation of powers concepts to conclude that agency
decisions must stand or fall on the basis of the reasons given by the agency and that courts cannot
uphold the agency decision on other grounds.”); Joshua I. Schwartz, Administrative Law Lessons
Regarding the Role of Politically Appointed Officials in Default Terminations, 30 PUB. CONT. L.J.
143, 205 (2001) (“The Chenery rule rests ultimately on considerations of separation of powers.”).
309. See Nathan Alexander Sales & Jonathan H. Adler, The Rest is Silence: Chevron
Deference, Agency Jurisdiction, and Statutory Silences, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1497, 1524 (observing
that agencies should make policy decisions because agencies are ultimately accountable to the
president, whereas courts are unaccountable); Lemos, supra note 114, at 449–50 (discussing the
role of accountability in executive branch agencies in comparison to courts).
310. See Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT SCI.
335, 338–39 (1974) (noting that agencies must go to legislative appropriations committees each
year and that there is competition for limited funds); Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran,
Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade
Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765, 769–70 (1983) (discussing several mechanisms of congressional
control, including public hearings and investigations, limited funding, and congressional control
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In contrast, the Federal Circuit answers only to the Supreme Court.
When the Federal Circuit takes power for itself from the PTO, the Federal
Circuit further insulates policy decisions from public accountability.
Consequently, clarity and uniformity come at a high price.311
D. Judicial Review of International Trade Commission Decisions
The Federal Circuit’s agency-like behavior extends to the ITC.
Although the Federal Circuit has granted Chevron deference to non-patentrelated ITC decisions, it has denied such deference to ITC patent
determinations. The sole exception is Judge Newman’s opinion in Kinik
Co. v. International Trade Commission.312 In dicta, the court stated that the
ITC was entitled to Chevron deference when it decided that a defense
under the Patent Act did not apply in ITC proceedings.313 This decision
was extremely controversial and led to Senate hearings on the subject.314
One important aspect of ITC adjudication is that it does not have a
preclusive effect in district courts. Just under two-thirds of all patent cases
litigated in the ITC are also litigated in a federal district court.315 One
would think that this would give the ITC more power, because its decisions
would bind subsequent district court litigation on the same patent.
However, in 1996, the Federal Circuit held that ITC decisions are not
entitled to preclusive effect.316 The court based this decision on legislative
history from the 1974 Tariff Act, in which Congress stated that the ITC
could only consider validity and enforceability when deciding whether
§ 337 was violated.317 Consequently, even if an ITC decision leads to an
undesirable outcome from the Federal Circuit’s perspective, it is free to
over appointments).
311. Some scholars have argued that patents are property-like, and that consequently, politicalbased changes are bad. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor
General, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 518, 548 (2010) (noting that granting the PTO stronger deference
would undermine the stability of patent property rights, and that “[r]apid changes in patent policy
could thus create the worst of all possible worlds from the standpoint of public policy, with little
encouragement of real innovation and much litigation.”). However, even if we view political-based
policy changes as detrimental, this does not change the fact that the Federal Circuit’s practice of
denying the PTO and ITC proper deference poses separation of powers problems.
312. Kinik Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 362 F.3d 1359, 1361, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
313. Id. at 1363.
314. See Process Patents: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007)
(statement of John R. Thomas) (testifying regarding controversy surrounding the Kinik decision),
available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cong/36.
315. Colleen V. Chien, Patently Protectionist? An Empirical Analysis of Patent Cases at the
International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 63, 70 (2008).
316. Texas Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1568–69 (Fed.
Cir. 1996).
317. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 93-1298, at 196 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7186,
7329); see also H.R. REP. NO. 93-571, at 78 (1974).
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disregard the decision in PTO and district court appeals.
In closing, the Federal Circuit’s review of PTO and ITC decisions does
not resemble typical judicial review of agency decisions. The Federal
Circuit minimizes deference to the agencies by misconstruing basic
principles of administrative law. It actively interprets patent decisions as
questions of law to avoid applying the correct standard of review.
By minimizing deference, the Federal Circuit may be fulfilling its
mandate of promoting uniformity in patent law. In doing so, however, the
Federal Circuit loses sight of the fact that it is dealing with a coequal
branch of government. These agencies are not the court’s alter ego, but
instead are part of the executive branch that has been entrusted by
Congress with policymaking powers. By taking these powers for itself, the
Federal Circuit undermines separation of powers.
IV. THE STABILITY OF THE COURT–AGENCY MODEL
When Congress created the Federal Circuit in 1982, it provided the
court with tools to become a powerful force in patent law. Congress likely
did not intend to alter the review of patent agency appeals, given that it was
silent about the treatment of PTO and ITC decisions.318 Nor did Congress
want to create an expert court, believing that appeals from non-patent
agencies would keep the Federal Circuit balanced.319 Yet Congress clearly
did want to create a court with enough power to prevent forum-shopping
and to bring uniformity to patent law.
The Federal Circuit did not take this opportunity for granted; over time,
it assumed an agency-like position in patent law. With encouragement
from the Supreme Court, it engaged in rulemaking by issuing mandatory
bright-line rules that created clarity in patent law,320 at the expense of good
policy.321 In doing so, the Federal Circuit filled a void left by Congress
when it failed to grant the PTO full substantive rulemaking authority, and
the Federal Circuit brought greater clarity and predictability to patent law.
The Federal Circuit continues to engage in agency-like adjudication,
sidestepping proper judicial review standards to allow for more hands-on
review of PTO and ITC appeals. Such activity was unnecessary, given that
318. See supra Section I.D.
319. H.R. REP NO. 97-312, at 19 (1981) (observing that the court would have “a varied docket
spanning a broad range of legal issues and types of cases,” thereby preventing specialization).
320. See supra notes 116–19, 123–26 & 131–32 and accompanying text.
321. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575, 1672–74 (2003) (noting that the Federal Circuit’s rule-based approach has disregarded the
policy consequences on different industries); John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront
of Patentability, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 609, 614 (2009) (arguing that clarity brought by rules
comes at the expense of durability); Rai, supra note 156, at 1040 (maintaining that bright-line rules
do not promote innovation policy).
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the PTO and ITC were capable of performing their appointed roles. The
court’s actions have, however, promoted the uniformity in patent law that
Congress desired.
Without Supreme Court intervention, this court–agency model could
have continued to bring uniformity to patent law as a whole. This is not to
say that such a model is preferable to the traditional one of having an
agency administer the statute, since the court–administrator model
necessarily sacrifices good policy making as well as the political
accountability inherent in the executive branch. Rather, the model would
have been stable, with the Federal Circuit wielding both executive and
judicial powers.
However, two current Supreme Court objectives are at odds with the
model. The first objective is to curb the Federal Circuit’s use of mandatory
bright-line rules. In justifying the need for flexible rules, the Court has
emphasized the limitations in the Federal Circuit’s statutory interpretation
powers. It is important to note that there is no evidence that Federal Circuit
rulemaking violates the Patent Act or the will of Congress. Indeed, the
Federal Circuit has clarified ambiguities in the Patent Act, not unlike how
an agency clarifies its ambiguous organic statute through rulemaking.
It is worth further exploration as to whether the Federal Circuit’s use of
rigid rules violates separation of powers, particularly the nondelegation
doctrine. Professor Margaret Lemos has discussed at length the problems
with judicially administered statutes under a nondelegation doctrine
theory.322 She observes that “[d]elegations to courts cannot be defended on
the same functional grounds as delegations to agencies for the simple
reason that courts are different from agencies in ways that are critical to the
nondelegation debate.”323
With regard to patent law, the Supreme Court appears to limit the
Federal Circuit’s ability to create rigid rules when Congress has not
expressly delegated interpretive authority to the Federal Circuit. As
discussed above, the Bilski Court restated the principle that “courts should
not read into the patent laws limitations and conditions which the
legislature has not expressed.”324 It then went one step further, stating that
courts do not have “carte blanche to impose other limitations that are
inconsistent with the text and the statute’s purpose and design.”325 This
emphasis on the metes and bounds of delegation to the court calls into
question whether the Federal Circuit has overstepped its authority from
Congress in issuing inflexible rules. The idea of the nondelegation doctrine
322. Lemos, supra note 114.
323. Id. at 445.
324. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226 (2010) (emphasis added) (quoting Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
325. Id.
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playing a role in delegations to Article III courts has only begun to be
explored.326
The second Supreme Court objective that the Federal Circuit has run
up against is the Court’s desire to unify administrative law. In Zurko, the
Supreme Court rebuked the Federal Circuit for failing to apply the judicial
review provision of the APA to appeals from the BPAI.327 The Court
emphasized that it will recognize only exceptions from the APA that are
explicitly created by Congress.328 This anti-exceptionalist position was
reiterated in the Court’s 2011 Mayo Foundation decision.329 There, the
Court held that Treasury Department regulations were entitled to Chevron
deference, notwithstanding older precedent that provided less deference.330
The Court stated: “We see no reason why our review of tax regulations
should not be guided by agency expertise pursuant to Chevron to the same
extent as our review of other regulations.”331
The Court’s reiteration of uniformity in administrative law bodes
poorly for the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit’s manipulation of law
and fact, its misconstruction of the Chenery doctrine, and its refusal to
apply proper deference to the ITC all highlight forms of patent
exceptionalism. These practices are therefore vulnerable to Supreme Court
scrutiny, regardless of their promotion of uniformity in patent law.
The competing objectives of Congress and the Supreme Court are on a
collision course, and one or both branches of government will ultimately
need to address them. If Congress wants the Federal Circuit to have
agency-like power, it can impose stricter review standards for PTO and
ITC decisions. Section 559 of the APA states that the standard of review
provisions of the APA “do not limit or repeal additional requirements
imposed by statute or otherwise recognized by law.”332 The Supreme Court
has noted that such a departure must be clear,333 so Congress would need to
be explicit.
Congress could also revise the Patent Act to state that the Federal
Circuit has broad leeway to interpret ambiguous statutory language.
However, such a move could result in backlash from the Supreme Court on
constitutional grounds, perhaps for a violation of separation of powers—as
326. For example, Professors Rafael Pardo and Kathryn Watts have recently discussed
nondelegation issues in the context of bankruptcy law and administrative law. See Rafael I. Pardo &
Kathryn A. Watts, The Structural Exceptionalism of Bankruptcy Administration, 60 UCLA L. REV.
(forthcoming 2012).
327. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 161–65 (1999).
328. Id. at 165.
329. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713 (2011).
330. Id. at 712–13.
331. Id. at 713.
332. 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2006).
333. Zurko, 527 U.S. at 155 (noting that “legislative departure from the norm must be clear”).
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was articulated in Chenery I—or for a nondelegation doctrine violation.334
In closing, the success of the Federal Circuit’s unorthodox role of
administrator has been undermined by Congress’s and the Supreme Court’s
competing goals and competing interpretations of law. Congress will
ultimately need to decide whether it wants to confront the Supreme Court
to keep the Federal Circuit powerful, or whether it is time to turn full
administrative responsibilities over to an agency.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit was established to bring uniformity to patent law
through creating a single court to hear patent appeals. But in creating a
specialized court with a mandate of uniformity, Congress inadvertently
created an agency-like entity in the judiciary. The consequence has been a
power struggle between the Federal Circuit and the executive branch, as
well as between the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court.
Part of the Federal Circuit’s behavior has been necessary. Rules
decrease uncertainty and prevent repeated litigation on the same issues. In
this regard, it is unclear whether the Federal Circuit has acted improperly.
The Supreme Court’s series of interventions might be more accurately
construed as an attack on Congress for granting the Federal Circuit too
much power, as opposed to the lower court acting outside of its authority.
However, the Federal Circuit is also actively taking power from the
executive branch. It has fought against the confines of the APA, attempting
to minimize deference to the PTO and ITC by fighting the application of
the APA’s judicial review provisions and by construing issues as questions
of law. It has furthermore disregarded the Supreme Court’s administrative
law precedent in the Chenery decisions.
One view is that the Federal Circuit is attempting to fill a void
Congress created when it chose to not give the PTO substantive
rulemaking authority. Congress’s failure to rectify the situation can only be
viewed as deliberate, given that most complex statutes are administered by
agencies with substantive rulemaking authority. Consequently, one can
argue that the Federal Circuit’s heavy-handed review of patent agency
appeals occurs with Congress’s tacit approval.
A more cynical story, however, is that the Federal Circuit is actively
taking power from the executive branch and is enriching its own status by
deliberately weakening the PTO and ITC. By virtue of having immense
power in a narrow area of law, the court has developed a cult of personality
while largely escaping scrutiny for its actions.
Whether the Federal Circuit is an accidental agency or a deliberate one,
it is caught between competing goals of the Supreme Court and Congress.
334. See supra note 309.
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Given the Supreme Court’s express desire to unify administrative law, it is
likely that we will see more interventions when the Federal Circuit fails to
give proper deference to agencies. This could force Congress to decide
whether it wishes to fight for its Article III administrator, or whether it
should utilize a more conventional route of granting an agency substantive
rulemaking authority.
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